Swiss Institute for Development
Lindenhof ● Bözingenstrasse 71, CH-2502 Biel, Switzerland
phone +41 32 344 30 50, fax +41 32 341 08 10, e-mail: sid@dial.eunet.ch

A potential social warning instrument

Final Report on China Anomie Project

Prof.Dr. Peter Atteslander
Prof.Dr. Li Hanlin
Prof.Dr. Judith Tanur
Dr. Qi Wang

Contents

Foreword

This monograph presents our final report of 1996 survey of urban China. We thank the participants of SAD's April and May conferences in New York and in Biel for their insightful criticism and comments. Our special thanks go to John Western with whom we had many fruitful discussions about anomie concepts and operationalization, to Johan Galtung who insightfully pointed out the linkage between big anomie and small anomie, and to Micheal Cernea for his comments on the importance of social environment in developing social indicators from survey items. We are also indebted to the members on the Chinese investigation team whose excellent field interviews had made the present research a reality.

Part One of this report discusses the conceptualization and construction of a potential early warning instrument that contains a multidimensional measure with four constructs: discontent; distrust; pessimism; and individual anomie. In our scale development, we followed the procedure of defining the concept first and then explaining the set of items expressive of that concept. The concepts were formulated in our theoretical assumptions at the early stage of this research and framed into measurable indicators in our 1996 questionnaire. Part Two of this report presents the instrument administration. Given that China is experiencing a period of transition where the old system and the new system coexist and contend, we expect that this anomic structure will have had a measurable impact on the urban Chinese population. Our instrument will help further the understanding of these stressful circumstances on the sentiments and the morale of this population. Part Three of this report investigates the relationships between the four components of our theoretical early social warning system. We suspect that there may be some discernable causal associations between these measures. We will present two diagrams to explicate these expectations. In conclusion, we will summarize our main research findings, their limitations, and some possible future research orientations.

Last but not least, we would like to express our appreciation to Gertrud Lenzer of The City University of New York who provided excellent working conditions in the United States for Hanlin Li. Without her academic support and understanding, and the institutional support of the Department of Sociology at Brooklyn College – which hosted Hanlin Li as Visiting Scholar – it would not have been possible to finish this report. We also wish to thank Patrick Moynihan, a Ph.D. candidate at Department of Sociology, SUNY at Stony Brook, who assisted intelligently in the preparation of this report.

1 An Early Social Warning Instrument: Concepts and Construction

The world is undergoing historical transitions. Great social and economic changes within a system are often accompanied by structural strains, especially when the old system and the new system coexist and clash. These stressful circumstances give rise to certain subjective feelings on the part of the individuals living within the system.

Such feeling states can be measured through opinion and attitude questions contained within survey instruments. Measuring the impact of stressful circumstances on both the morale and the beliefs of a population experiencing such upheaval would be of great interest not only to decision-makers, but also to the general public who may want to understand the effects of system transition. The development of such an instrument could result in an early warning system of social unrest.

In the development of our measures, we followed the procedure of defining the concept first and then finding a set of items expressive of that concept. Moreover, the concepts were formulated in our theoretical assumptions in the early stage of this research and framed into measurable indicators in our 1996 questionnaire administered to 4000 urban dwellers in China.

We propose that an early social warning instrument should be able to measure the overall negative effects of system transition upon individuals *with only a few core indicators that touch the sensitive issues in the surveyed area and at the same time are general enough to embrace the cultural difference across geographical boundaries.* Such an instrument should consist of multidimensional measures tapping different aspects of subjectively experienced social events. We categorize these subjective experiences into the following four domains: (1) discontent (feelings of dissatisfaction about society and one's place within that society); (2) distrust (doubts concerning the capacity of government to handle the problems that emerge during system transition); (3) pessimism (a cynical view of the social opportunity structure); and (4) individual anomie (an apathetic attitude pertaining to general issues of daily life).

In the four sections that follow we will present our concepts and measurements of each of the domains. We maintain that the constructs in these four domains are conceptually distinct from each other. However, the empirical interrelationships between these domains allows for the construction of a measurement continuum. For the scale development of these constructs, we analyzed the responses of 4000 urban dwellers to approximately 200 attitude and opinion questions. We correlated all the items in each domain, and dropped those items that were uncorrelated with other items. Our practical criterion for selecting items was that they should show substantially stronger associations within groupings than across groupings. Measurements of the four constructs were then developed into four scales using a total of 32 items. Using Pearson’s correlation coefficients and Cronbach's coefficient alpha, we validated each of the 32 items into one of our four domains. Principal Component factor analysis were then used as a selection procedure to identify the *core elements* extracted from each scale. The results are presented and discussions follow for each scale.

Organizationally, Section 1 contains the analysis of the discontent measure; Section 2, the distrust in government measure; Section 3, the pessimism measure; and Section 4, the individual anomie measure.

1.1 Discontent

In this section, we will discuss our conceptualization and measurement of *discontent*. Through interitem analysis and reliability tests, we developed a composite measure of discontent from our survey items. Furthermore, we identify the core components in the discontent scale.

Concepts

There are many potential sources for people's discontent, especially in a changing society. Our focus, however, is on two main sources that concern people's immediate interests: (1) their share of the national wealth pie, and (2) their opinions about larger social and economic issues concerning everyday life during a system transition. We label the former type *individual discontent* and the latter type *system discontent*.

We argue that individual discontent is about personal experience within a stratified system: individual assessments of system equity in relation to class position. For example, some people perceive the system from the top of a social ladder, others from the bottom. As such, perceptions are not independent of social status.

On the system level, we maintain that discontent may be measured through respondent disagreement with various aspects of the state's new policies and practices. Conceptually, China is considered to be in a state of transition from orthodox socialism to a more open form of socialism. Included among the many profound changes accompanying this new type of socialism is the government's official denunciation of such traditional ideologies as: "Putting Politics (Class Struggle) in Command," "Getting Rich Together," "Capitalism is a System of Exploitation," and "Common Interest Should be Over and Above that of the Individuals." Some of the consequences of these new ideological and political orientations include, but are not limited to: China's opening itself to the West; rapid economic growth; the widening gap in wealth between the rich and the poor; and a diversification of socialist public ownership. We would expect that individuals who cannot embrace this new normative structure and adapt themselves to these new situations will feel betrayed by the system and resent the changes. They may become overwhelmed with the problems resulting from the transition and more likely to feel discontent with the system as a whole.

Measurements

As previously stated, measurement of discontent should encompass at least two dimensions: subjective feelings in relation to individual placement in the stratification system and opinions concerning larger issues of government. Feelings of discontent about individual socioeconomic status (SES) may be gained from personal assessments of system equity in terms of individual income, social esteem, and social benefits. Feelings of discontent about the system itself may be tapped from individual opinions concerning larger issues of state policies and practices.

Seventy-six attitude items were initially devised in our questionnaire to measure people's feelings of discontent. Five-point Likert scales were used as the response options for

most of these items, with lower values representing lower levels of discontent and higher values representing higher levels of discontent. In Table 1, we present a selection of 14 items from two question sets measuring individual feelings of discontent with the system. In Table 2, we present a selection of eight items from three question sets devised to tap people's feelings of discontent about their individual SES in the system. For items not included in Table 1 and Table 2, refer to Appendix III.

Respondents were presented with a list of statements about current state policies and practices, and asked their opinions about these issues. In Set One (Table 1), response options ranged from *absolutely true* (1) to *absolutely not true* (5). In Set Two (Table 1), response options on a series of social and economic issues ranged from *most unacceptable* (1) to *most acceptable* (5).

Table 1: A Sample of Attitude Questions Tapping Respondents' Opinion about State Policies and Practices

Set One: I would like you to tell your opinions about how true the following statements are:	
Q162	Overall, the gap between the rich and the poor is widening to an unfair extent.
Q163	Inflation in our country is going up out of control.
Q164	The present political corruption is becoming a social epidemic.
Q165	Nowadays it is hard to find a crime-free place to live.
Q166	Nowadays there are no clear moral standards in the society.
Q167	The social order is increasingly unstable.
Q168	Our society has a very low tolerance for opinions and behaviors that are against the mainstream.
Q169	There is no such thing as democracy or a legal system in our country.
Set Two: of the following changes that have come along during recent years of economic reforms, which, in your own opinion, are the completely unacceptable ones and the completely acceptable ones?	
Q202	Rising prices.
Q203	Loss of medical insurance, and other social security measures.
Q207	Expanding income difference.
Q209	Unstable social order.
Q211	Not get enough recognition from the workplace or society.
Q212	Personal achievement and capability have been ignored by society.

Note: Questions in Table 1.1 represent a selected list only. For the complete questionnaire see Appendix III on the Discontent Item Pools at the back of this monograph.

In our question item sample, respondents were presented with all the dimensions manifest in China's present stratification system and were asked to compare themselves with others (Table 2, Sets One and Two) and to rank themselves in the system (Table 2, Set Three). In both Set One and Set Two, respondents were asked to respond using a

five-point agree-disagree scale. However, they are asked to shift their reference group from people they work with in their Danwei in Set One to society at large in Set Two. The third set of questions asked respondents to rank themselves on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest).

Table 2: A Sample of Attitude Questions of Respondents' Assessment of Their Socio-Economic Status (SES)

Set One: Compare yourself with the people working with you in the same *Danwei,* how satisfied are you in the following terms	
Q154	Are you basically satisfied with your monetary income ?
Q155	Are you basically satisfied with the social esteem you get from society ?
Q156	Are you basically satisfied with the total social benefit package ?
Set Two: Compare yourself with the people of the society at large, how satisfied are you in the following terms:	
Q159	Thinking about your monetary income ?
Q160	Thinking about the social recognition you get from the society ?
Q161	Thinking about the total social benefit package?
Set Three: If people can be grouped into five hierarchical groups, which groups do you think you would fall into: 1 is the lowest and 5 is the highest	
Q157	Place yourself in the five groups compared with the people in your *Danwei* ?
Q158	Place yourself in the five groups compared with the people of the society at large?

Note: Questions in Table 2 represent a selected list only. For the complete questionnaire see Appendix III on the Discontent Item Pools at the back of this monograph.

Results

In constructing the discontent scale, we first selected items from the pool by investigating item correlations and arranging them in accordance with our research assumptions. Next, we did item analysis to test undimensionality of each subscale. Then we carried out principal component factor analysis to identify the core items the scale. Finally validity tests were performed on the subsequent scale using Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha. The following paragraphs explain our procedures and the resulting statistics.

Item analysis

The purpose of an item analysis is to find those items that form an internally consistent scale and to eliminate those items that do not increase scale reliability. Using responses from 4000 urban dwellers to approximately 200 attitude and opinion questions, we correlated all of the items in each domain and dropped those items that were not associated. Our practical criterion for selecting item group membership was that items within groups must exhibit substantially stronger correlations than items across groupings.

Through this item analysis we were able to reduce our original 76 item pool to the nine items listed below. The items and their correlation coefficients are presented in Table 3.

ITEM1: *Comparing yourself with others in the society, are you basically satisfied with your monetary income from work? (Q159)*

ITEM2: *Comparing yourself with others in the society, are you basically satisfied with the social esteem you get from the society? (Q160)*

ITEM3: *Comparing yourself with others in the society, are you basically satisfied with the employment security/social benefits package you get from the society? (Q161)*

ITEM4: *Overall, the gap between the rich and the poor is widening to an unfair extent. (Q162)*

ITEM5: *Inflation is going up out of control. (Q163)*

ITEM6: *The present political corruption is becoming a social epidemic. (Q164)*

ITEM7: *Nowadays there are no clear moral standards in the society. (Q165)*

ITEM8: *It is hard to find a crime-free place to live. (Q166)*

ITEM9: *There is no such thing as democracy or a legal system in our country. (Q167)*

Table 3: Pearson's Correlation Coefficients for Nine Discontent Items

(n) = 3997	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Item1	1.00								
Item2	**.669**	1.00							
Item3	**.566**	**.536**	1.00						
Item4	.231	.215	.214	1.00					
Item5	.193	.212	.196	**.435**	1.00				
Item6	.203	.222	.201	**.414**	**.423**	1.00			
Item7	.167	.188	.205	**.291**	**.310**	**.381**	1.00		
Item8	.138	.157	.171	**.298**	**.325**	**.379**	**.451**	1.00	
Item9	.167	.161	.211	**.203**	**.251**	**.318**	**.375**	**.416**	1.00

Table 3 shows that the correlation coefficients for the nine discontent items range from modest to strong. We highlighted the two separate blocks to show the distinctiveness of the two set of components in conformity to our assumptions about individual and system discontent.

Cronbach's coefficient alpha was calculated for the nine items to further test for interitem reliability. We agree with Devellis's claim (Scale Development, 1991:83) that virtually all of the problems associated with scale development research – a noncentral mean, poor variability, negative correlations among items, low item-scale correlation, and weak inter-item correlations – can be detected by alpha and may result in a reduced alpha value among the measurement items. In our reliability estimation, we adopted the widely

accepted rule-of-thumb suggested by Nunnally (Psychometric Theory, 1978) that the alpha value should reach .70 for a scale to be considered internally consistent.

Our nine item discontent scale yielded a raw item alpha value of .78 and standardized item alpha value of .79. This indicates strong internal consistency among the nine items and suggests that a common, underlying dimension exists among them.

Next, we applied factor analysis to the set of discontent items. The purpose of this is two-fold: to validate our scale again our previous theoretical assumptions and to identify the *core indicators* in our discontent scale. Principal Components Factor Analysis with varimax rotation was used. In this factor analysis, factors with eigenvalues of 1.0 or greater before rotation are selected and items with factor loadings of .40 or less before rotation are excluded. The results of the factor procedure are presented in Table 4.

Table 4: Item Loadings on Principal Components Factor Analysis of Discontent Measurements

		Factor Loading	
Item No	Variables	1	2
Item8	High crime rate	.729	
Item6	Political corruption	.709	
Item7	Absence of moral standards	.696	
Item5	Inflation going up	.649	
Item9	Absence of democracy and legal system	.616	
Item4	Gap between the rich and the poor	.603	
Item1	Satisfaction with income		.874
Item2	Satisfaction with social esteem		.854
Item3	Satisfaction with social benefits package		.789
	Eigenvalue	3.336	1.62
	Variance Explained (%)	37.0	18.0

As expected, the principal component analysis (with varimax rotation) yielded two factors which we interpreted as representing the two subdimensions of a unidimensional scale: *system discontent* (factor 1) and *individual discontent* (factor 2). The factoral structure found in our data confirms the presence of two separate domains in people's feelings of discontent: at system level and at their own personal level.

Homogeneity of Factors

To determine the homogeneity of our two item sets, we performed two independent tests (item-total and item-remainder statistics) on the latent factors (system discontent and personal discontent). This procedure yielded the results in Table 5 (personal discontent) and Table 6 (system discontent). Columns one in Table 5 and Table 6 list the item number. Columns two and three give the scale mean and scale variance if item is deleted. Columns four give the correlation between the item and the total scale. Columns five give the multiple R assuming the listed item as dependent variable. And the last column

showes the Alpha value if the listed item is deleted from the set. It should be noted that a scale with high reliability should show a high alpha value as well as a stable alpha value with any single item deleted.

Table 5: Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha for Items in Personal Discontent Set

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item – Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
Item1	6.9037	2.0690	.7071	.5087	.6963
Item2	6.7973	2.1076	.6838	.4846	.7215
Item3	7.0946	2.4185	.6028	.3647	.8022

Reliability Coefficients: 3 items
Alpha = .8128 Standardized item alpha = .8122

Table 6: Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha *for Items in System Discontent Set*

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item – Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
Item4	18.7881	11.8002	.4613	.2676	.7387
Item5	19.1689	11.4642	.4952	.2860	.7302
Item6	18.7115	11.5081	.5570	.3221	.7164
Item7	19.4161	10.8827	.5265	.2943	.7219
Item8	19.4884	10.8610	.5488	.3196	.7156
Item9	19.7873	11.3191	.4484	.2348	.7439

Reliability Coefficients 6 items
Alpha = .7625 Standardized item alpha = .7647

Note in Table 6 (system discontent), all six item alpha values remained nearly constant with the deletion of any single item. Alpha values ranged from .72 to .74, indicating homogeneity within the set. However, the three item alpha in Table 5 (personal discontent) shows some degree of instability when Item3 is dropped from the set. However, we decided not to delete the item to preserve the theoretical soundness of our conceptualization of discontent. We maintain that the exclusion of Item3 (measuring dissatisfaction about individual job security and the social benefits package) would result in an imperfect grasp of the impact of people's SES on discontent in contemporary China.

Core vs. Nation-Specific Discontent Indicators

The two distinct components extracted by the factor exploration, as we proposed, may be taken as the c*ore discontent components* for cross-cultural studies. Of course, the nine individual items that form the discontent scale may have to be replaced by different indicators specific to the cultural and social environment of the test area.

Discussion

Overall, we conclude that our discontent measure, consisting of nine observable items and two latent constructs, supports our conceptual assumptions about people's feelings of discontent. In addition, it provides a nice fit to our data. By combining the total item scores and dividing by the number of items in the set, we have a discontent scale with a normal distribution: mean of 3.72; mode of 3.67; median of 3.78; and standard deviation of .56. The skewness is -.323 and the kurtosis is .124, indicating a normal distribution of the sample (Table 7).

The reliability test of the total discontent set yielded a score of approximately .79 for both the raw alpha and the standardized alpha. The scale explained a total variance of 55 percent: 37 percent by the system discontent component and 18 percent by the individual discontent component. The alpha reliability for the two separated latent factors identified by principal component factor analysis are both within our acceptable range: .81 and .76, respectively. Eliminating any of the items does not significantly improve the alpha value for the total scale.

Table 7: Discontent Scale Statistics from 1996 China Survey (n = 3994)

Measures of Scale Central Tendency	
Mean	3.7
Mode	3.7
Median	3.8
Measures of Scale Spread	
Standard deviation	0.56
Minimum	1.2
Maximum	5.0
Range	3.8
Scale Distribution	
Skewness	-0.323
Kurtosis	0.124

We thus consider the discontent item set as a valid measurement scale. We propose that the two underlying factors identified by the factor analysis (system discontent and personal discontent) be considered *core discontent components* in that they may have cross-cultural implications and may be adopted in nations other than China. However, system-specific indicators may be needed to construct valid measures to replace the items we used in the 1996 China survey.

In the following sections, we will not repeat our discussions about methodical issues but will proceed with the actual statistics in the instrument development and our interpretation.

1.2 Distrust

In this section, we discuss our conceptualization and measurement of people's *distrust* in government. Like in the previous section, we first develop the distrust scale, then perform item analysis and reliability tests to assess this scale's quality. And last we identify the core components in the distrust scale through factor analysis. Only resulting statitics are presented. For methodical issues, however, refer to the section on the discontent scale.

Concepts

As we discussed earlier, people may develop strong discontent due to their position in the stratification system or due to their disagreement with state policies and practices. However, they may still remain optimistic if they believe in the government's capability to overcome these problems.

Opinions of the government's competence may be reflected in evaluations of the government's performance in dealing with emerging problems in three realms: social, political, and economic. We measured the most sensitive issues in these three areas by allowing respondents to estimate whether their best interests are being competently served by the government. We expect that a higher degree of respondent doubt in the government's capability to deal with the emerging social, political, and economic problems will reveal a higher level of distrust in government. Coupled with feelings of discontent, people's distrust in government constitutes another important signal of the strains imposed by the system.

Measurements

Twenty-five items were included in our questionnaire to tap feelings of distrust. These questions addressed some of the most crucial problems facing city residents in contemporary China. Such problems include (but are not limited to): the rising crime rate; massive rural-urban migration; increasing unemployment rates; political corruption; increasing earnings inequality; and the dissolution of traditional values. These are well-acknowledged and concrete problems that continue to plague policy-makers as well as the general public since the Chinese Economic Reforms of the late 1970s. In Table 8 below, we present a selection of questions that were given to respondents to measure confidence in the government. The first set of questions required respondents to use a five-point Likert response set to rate the government's capability in dealing with a series of issues, with lower values representing low trust and higher values representing high trust. The second question set asked respondents to select the three issues that they feel most angry about.

Table 8: A Sample of Attitude Questions Tapping Respondents' Confidence in Government's Capability

Set One: how would you rate the government's capability in dealing with the following issues on a scale of 1 to 5.	
Q179	its capability to curtail high crime rate
Q180	its capability to maintain a stable society
Q181	its capability to expose and punish political corruption
Q182	its capability to contain earnings inequality
Q183	its capability to reduce unemployment
Q184	its capability to regulate price rise
Q185	its capability to create a democratic atmosphere
Q186	its capability to protect environment
Q187	its capability to regulate rural-urban migration
Q188	its capability to uphold traditional values
Q189	its capability to ease urban housing problems

Set Two: Please select the three top items from the following list that you feel most angry about:	
Q216-218	Political corruption
Q216-218	Extravagant spending style
Q216-218	Expanding gaps between the rich and the poor
Q216-218	Low incomes for intellectuals
Q216-218	Power over the law
Q216-218	Frequent policy changes
Q216-218	Fake products with bad quality
Q216-218	Unreasonable fees and price changes
Q216-218	Tax evasion
Q216-218	Environmental pollution
Q216-218	Bad social/moral value
Note:	Questions in Table 8 represent a selected list only. For the complete list, see Appendix III on the Distrust Item Pools at the back of this monograph.

Results

In this section, we present the selected items in the distrust scale, Item analysis, validity test, and identify the core items in the scale.

Item Analysis

As previously stated, the purpose of an item analysis is to find those items that form an internally consistent set. Thus the first quality we seek in a possible set is that the items in the domain should be highly intercorrelated. Based on the item correlation coefficients, we were able to reduce our original 20 item pool to the 11 items listed below. Table 9 contains the matrix of correlation coefficients for these 11 items. In accordance with our previous assumptions, we arranged and highlighted the item coefficients in three separate realms: social, economic, and political.

ITEM10: *How would you rate on a scale of 1 to 5 government's capability to curtail the high crime rate? (Q179)*

ITEM11: *How would you rate on a scale of 1 to 5 government's capability to maintain a stable society? (Q180)*

ITEM12: *How would you rate on a scale of 1 to 5 government's capability to expose and punish political corruption? (Q181)*

ITEM13: *How would you rate on a scale of 1 to 5 government's capability to contain earning inequality? (Q182)*

ITEM14: *How would you rate on a scale of 1 to 5 government's capability to reduce unemployment? (Q183)*

ITEM15: *How would you rate on a scale of 1 to 5 government's capability to regulate price rise? (Q184)*

ITEM16: *How would you rate on a scale of 1 to 5 government's capability to create a democratic atmosphere? (Q185)*

ITEM17: *How would you rate on a scale of 1 to 5 government's capability to protect the environment? (Q186)*

ITEM18: *How would you rate on a scale of 1 to 5 government's capability to regulate rural-urban migration? (Q187)*

ITEM19: *How would you rate on a scale of 1 to 5 government's capability to uphold traditional values? (Q188)*

ITEM20: *How would you rate on a scale of 1 to 5 government's capability to ease urban housing problems? (Q189)*

Table 9: Pearson's Correlation Coefficients Matrix of Distrust Items

	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
										(n) = 3997	
Item10	1.00										
Item11	**.613**	1.00									
Item12	**.400**	**.449**	1.00								
Item13	.286	.342	.377	1.00							
Item14	.233	.333	.306	**.454**	1.00						
Item15	.284	.423	.449	**.352**	**.338**	1.00					
Item16	.398	.441	.405	.328	.373	.309	1.00				
Item17	.274	.273	.234	.273	.273	.178	**.430**	1.00			
Item18	.240	.265	.218	.248	.319	.221	**.360**	**.493**	1.00		
Item19	.358	.384	.345	.395	.350	.239	**.450**	**.437**	**.379**	1.00	
Item20	.212	.235	.217	.174	.263	.222	**.289**	**.301**	**.331**	**.315**	1.00

We highlighted the items in three separate blocks in accordance with our assumptions in the correlation matrix. Note that all items within each block are highly correlated. In addition, our 11 item distrust set yielded a raw item alpha value of .84 and a standardized item alpha value of .84, indicating very high internal consistency. However, notice the high correlation between items identified in the political block (items 10,11, and 12) and items identified not in the political block (especially items 13, 14, 15, 16, and 19). Some explanations will presented in the discussion of the factor analysis.

Using factor analysis (Table 10), three factors were extracted from the distrust items. We interpreted factor 1 as representing respondents' rating of the government's capability in dealing with social issues, factor 2 as representing their rating of the government's capability in dealing with political issues, and factor 3 as representing their rating of the government's capability in dealing with economical issues. Together, the three factors explained 59.1 percent of the variance: 39.3 percent by factor 1; 11.2 percent by factor 2; and 8.6 percent by factor 3. Again our cutting point for selecting items for a factor is .40 and above. All our item loadings are well above that criterion.

A closer look at the factor loadings of some items may challenge our interpretation of the three underlying factors. However, this time we allow the empirical loadings prescribe the item interpretation.

Table 10: Item Loading for Principal Components Analysis (Varimax Rotation) of Distrust in Government Scale.

Item No	Variables	Factors Loading		
		1 (social),	**2 (political),**	**3 (economic)**
Item17	Protect environment	.785		
Item18	Regulate rural-urban migration	.758		
Item19	Uphold traditional values	.593		
Item20	Ease urban housing problems	.578		
Item16	Create a democratic atmosphere	.511		
Item10	Curtail high crime rate	.837		
Item11	Maintain a stable society	.793		
Item12	Expose and punish political corruption	.569		.474
Item13	Contain earning inequality	.744		
Item14	Reduce unemployment	.729		
Item15	Regulate price rise	.633		
	Eigenvalue	4.322	1.229	.946
	Variance Explained (%)	39.3	11.2	8.6

A closer inspection of the factor loadings in Table 10 indicates that Item12 has high loadings on two factors: . 57 on factor 2 (political realm) and . 47 on factor 3 (economic realm). While this double loaded item may cast doubts on the homogeneity of the three extracted factors, we find a very plausible explanation by looking closely at the meaning of this item. Political corruption in contemporary China is almost always involved with economic activities, such as bribery. So this item may easily fall into the realm of both political and economic issues. In this case we placed Item12 in the political area because the item loading is greater there.

According to Table 10, in the social realm people are concerned with issues of environmental protection, large-scale rural migration, the erosion of traditional values, and the shortage of adequate housing in urban areas. In the political realm, people expected government to do a better job in maintaining a stable social order and in exposing and punishing political corruption. In the economic realm, people thought the government was not doing a good job on controlling rising prices, unemployment, and income gaps.

Homogeneity of factors

Finally, we examined the homogeneity of our three separate item sets. Item-total and item-remainder statistics are presented in Table 11 for the social factor, Table 12 for the political factor, and Table 13 for the economic factor.

Table 11: Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha *for Social Issue Items*

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Item-Total Correlation	Squared Alpha Correlation	Corrected Multiple if Item Deleted
Item16	13.9022	5.2509	.5232	.2901	.7070
Item17	13.7233	4.8097	.5785	.3549	.6851
Item18	13.5952	4.9662	.5401	.3090	.7000
Item19	13.6855	5.1200	.5434	.3071	.6994
Item20	14.0035	5.4274	.4096	.1703	.7468

Reliability Coefficients 5 items
Alpha = .7523; Standardized item alpha = .7526

Table 12: Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha *for Political Issue Items*

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Item- Total Correlation	Corrected Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
Item10	6.7180	1.5068	.5908	.3954	.6193
Item11	6.5922	1.5674	.6355	.4256	.5714
Item12	6.1709	1.6933	.4718	.2268	.7588

Reliability Coefficients 3 items
Alpha = .7385; Standardized item alpha = .7405

Table 13: Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha *for Economic Issue Items*

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Item- Total Correlation	Corrected Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
Item13	7.4681	1.3446	.4931	.2508	.5056
Item14	7.5854	1.2933	.4805	.2427	.5204
Item15	7.8646	1.4038	.4046	.1640	.6242

Reliability Coefficients 3 items
Alpha = .6485; Standardized item alpha = .6492

Note in Table 11, each alpha remains relatively constant with the deletion of any single item from the set. The alphas range from .69 to .75, indicating a relative consistent set. However, the three alphas based on single item deletion in Table 12 (political issues) show some degree of instability. For example, if Item11 is removed from this set, then the alpha decreases by .16, and if Item10 is deleted from this group, the alpha decreases by .12. This seems to indicate that Item12 is somewhat distinct from the other two items. This may be due to the high loading of Item12 on both economic and political issues. We

placed this item in the domain of political issues because its higher factor loading there. In Table 13 (economic issues), the item alphas again show some degree of instability. Here, we suspect that the distinctiveness of the three extracted factors is somewhat blurred due to item interpretations.

Discussion

Overall, we conclude that our measure of distrust in government consisting of 11 manifest items and 3 latent factors upholds our conceptual framework. The empirical data, however, did not produce a nice fit to our data. We set the parameter of the number of factors to 3 while performing the factor analysis. As a result, we encountered some difficulties in interpreting the item loadings. We thus suggest some refinement of the item-set in this distrust scale.

By combining the total item scores and dividing by the number of items in the set, we have a scale mean of 3.49, a mode of 3.36, a median of 3.46, and a standard deviation of .46 (Table 14). Reliability tests of the total set yielded a raw alpha of .84 and a standardized alpha of .84. The scale explained a total variance of 59 percent. The alpha reliability for the three separated latent factors identified by principal component analysis are generally within our acceptable range: .74, .75, and .65 respectively.

Table 14: Distrust in Government Scale Statistics from 1996 China Survey

n = 3997

Measures of Scale Central Tendency	
Mean	3.5
Mode	3.4
Median	3.5
Measures of Scale Spread	
Standard Deviation	0.46
Minimum	1.5
Maximum	5.0
Range	3.5
Scale Distribution	
Skewness	-0.087
Kurtosis	0.431

We therefore consider the set a valid measurement scale for gauging people's distrust in government. We further suggest that the three underlying factors identified from the distrust in government scale be considered *core components* in the scale and should be examined in other test sites. However, culturally-specific survey items would need to be created to tap relevant concerns of the population of interest. Last but not the least, the present item-set may need some more exploration if a retest is to be conducted.

1.3 Pessimism

Concepts

The dictionary definition of *pessimism* may be broader than how we will conceptualize this term: a cynical view of the opportunity structure of society. Our research interest is focused on people's assessment of their past mobility and their judgement of the openness of the opportunity structure. We argue that if people feel deprived of any upward mobility in the past and do not see any prospect for mobility in the future, they would be frustrated by the system. This may be the case in a country like China where the government leaders have promised economic reforms that would bring an unprecedented level of affluence. Where individual prosperity is not realized, respondents may be more likely to blame the system for their "failure" or unfulfilled aspirations.

This conceptualization of pessimism finds support in Robert Merton's theory of social anomie wherein cultural goals do not always match the institutionalized means available to individuals. According to Merton, people tend to resort to deviance if they feel they do not have the means to reach culturally prescribed goals, such as monetary success. For Merton, the gulf between the desire and expectation for upward mobility (to which people are socialized into believing) and the low achievement levels caused by limited opportunities, leads to the breakdown of legitimate norms and ultimately deviant adaptation for some.

Measurements

Approximately 58 items were designed in our 1996 questionnaire which tapped people's opinion of the opportunity structure in China. Table 15 presents a sample from this item pool. The items were divided into two domains: individual past mobility and future mobility. For the total item pool of questions about the opportunity structure, refer to Appendix III.

In capturing people's view of their past mobility, for example, we asked respondents to compare their present position with that of the previous 2 to 3 years, and to indicate whether there had been any improvement in terms of their monetary incomes, their social prestige, and the social benefits packages. There were five response options ranging from 1 to 5, with low values representing little improvement and higher values indicating greater improvement. The lower values were interpreted as higher cynicism about the social opportunity structure. For their anticipation of the future, respondents were given three separate questions, each concerning a separate issue: prospects for their personal future; the direction the country is heading; and the opportunity structure in China. For each question concerning their overall view of future mobility, the respondents were given five selection choices ranging from 1 to 5, with lower values representing low anticipation which, in turn, indicates higher cynicism.

Table 15: A Sample of Attitude Questions Tapping Respondents' Opinions about their Past and Future Mobility

Set One: Compare yourself with previous two or three years, how do you describe your situation:	
Q21	do you see any improvement in your monetary earnings?
Q22	do you see any improvement in terms of your social esteem?
Q23	do you see any improvement regarding the employment security/benefits package you get from the society?
Set Two: Compare yourself with people around you, how do you estimate your situation:	
Q24	think about their income level, is it higher than yours, same as yours or lower than yours?
Q25	think about their employment security/benefits package, is it higher than yours, same as yours or lower than yours?
Q26	think about their social esteem, is it higher than yours, same as yours or lower than yours?
Q170	How much do you agree with the statement: personally I don't see any future for myself.
Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following sayings:	
Q199	In our country, opportunity is not always available to those who try to strive ahead.
Q200	I don't feel optimistic about the directions we are going.

Note: Questions in the above table represent a selected list only. For the complete questionnaire, see Appendix III of the Pessimism Item Pool at the back of this paper.

Results

As we have done with the previous scales, our analysis begins with the selection of individual survey items by investigating item correlations and then arranging them in accordance with our research hypotheses. Next, principal component factor analysis is performed to determine the core elements in the scale. Finally, a series of validity tests were conducted.

Item analysis

We reduced the 58 item pool to the following six items, and a matrix of correlation coefficients is presented in Table 16. The two highlighted sets in Table 16 refer to our hypothesized domains for our measures of pessimism.

ITEM21: *Compare yourself with the previous 2 – 3 years, do you see any improvement in your monetary earnings?*

ITEM22: *Compare yourself with the previous 2 – 3 years, do you see any improvement in terms of your social esteem?*

ITEM23: *Compare yourself with the previous 2 – 3 years, do you see any improvement regarding the employment security/benefits package you get from the society?*

ITEM24: *Personally I don't see any future for myself.*

ITEM25: *I don't feel optimistic about the directions we are going.*

ITEM26: *In our country, opportunity is not always available to those who try to strive ahead.*

Table 16: Pearson's Correlation Coefficients Matrix of Opportunity Items

(n) = 3997	21	22	23	24	25	26
Item21	1.00					
Item22	**.481**	1.00				
Item23	**.481**	**.522**	1.00			
Item24	.267	.246	.300	1.00		
Item25	.214	.187	.240	**.407**	1.00	
Item26	.067	.079	.092	**.181**	**.138**	1.00

Table 16 shows that our pessimism items, with the exception of Item26, are moderately well associated with each other. The Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the six pessimism items was estimated at .68 for the raw Alpha, and .68 for the standardized Alpha. We consider it as an indication of modest interitem correlation. We kept Item 26 in the set because it is a well-tested item in many other measures.

Next we applied factor analysis to the pessimism scale items. The principal component analysis (with varimax rotation) yielded two factors which we interpreted as representing a pessimistic estimation of one's past mobility (factor 1) and a cynical outlook on one's future mobility (factor 2). Item loadings of .40 or greater were identified and selected as constituents of the factors. Table 17 shows the item loadings and factor coefficients from the procedure.

Table 17: Item Loading on Principal Components Analysis of Pessimism Measures

		Factor Loadings	
Item No	Variables	1(Past M)	2(Future M)
Item21	Improvement in monetary earnings	.814	
Item22	Improvement of social esteem	.796	
Item23	Improvement in benefits package	.788	
Item24	Don't see personal future		.713
Item25	Don't feel optimistic of going direction		.707
Item26	No opportunity available		.649
	Eigenvalue	2.403	1.124
	Variance Explained (%)	40.00	18.70

Homogeneity of Factors

We examined the homogeneity of the scale components. Two independent tests were performed on the two separate latent factors identified through our principal component factor analysis. Calculations of item-total and item-remainder statistics are presented in Table 18 and Table 19.

Table 18 shows that on the factor of past mobility, all three item alphas remained constant with the deletion of any single item from the set. The values ranged from .65 to .68, indicating all items fitting the set. However, the three item alpha in Table 19 for the factor of future mobility shows obvious instability when Item26 is dropped from the item set. We suggest that better indicators should be used in place of Item26 on the measurement of people's judgement of the openness of the opportunity structure.

Table 18: Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha for Past Mobility Items

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Item- Total Correlation	Corrected Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
Item21	6.4522	2.5473	.5511	.3043	.6805
Item22	5.5901	2.5009	.5801	.3410	.6443
Item23	5.9477	2.8841	.5826	.3411	.6496
Reliability Coefficients 3 items Alpha = .7425; Standardized item alpha = .7460					

Table 19: Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha for Future Mobility Items

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Item- Total Correlation	Corrected Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
Item24	5.6567	1.9267	.3860	.1803	.2429
Item25	6.2662	2.3470	.3645	.1690	.3033
Item26	5.7018	2.7183	.1916	.0376	.5723
Reliability Coefficients 3 items Alpha = .4909; Standardized item alpha = .4884					

Discussion

Overall, we conclude that our pessimism scale consisting of six manifest items and two latent factors uphold, to a large extent, our conceptual framework, but future research may employ items that better measure individual opinion of the openness of the opportunity structure.

We nevertheless consider the set as a valid measure within an early social warning instrument. We suggest that the two underlying factors identified be considered *core components* in the scale as they have cross-cultural implications in anomie research and may be adopted in other cultures. However, indicators specific to the test area may be

needed when using this scale. This is especially true with the measurements of people's attitudes toward the openness of the opportunity structure.

Table 20 displays the scale statistics. By combining the total item scores and dividing it by the number of items in the set, we have a scale mean of 2.9, a mode of 2.8, a median of 3.0, a standard deviation of .59, and a range of 4. Reliability tests of the total set yielded scores of .68 and .68 for the raw alpha and standardized alpha, respectively. The scale explains a total variance of 58 percent. The alpha reliability for the two separate latent factors identified by principal component analysis are .74 and .49 respectively.

Table 20: Pessimism Scale Statistics from 1996 China Survey

n = 3994	
Measures of Scale Central Tendency	
Mean	2.9
Mode	2.8
Median	3.0
Measures of Scale Spread	
Standard Deviation	0.59
Minimum	1.0
Maximum	5.0
Range	4.0
Scale Distribution	
Skewness	0.33
Kurtosis	0.18

1.4 Individual Anomie

Concepts

The inclusion of a measurement of *anomia* in a social warning system can never be over-emphasized. This concept refers to a state of mind that individuals or groups of individuals enter when they were not sure about their future, cannot turn to anyone for trust, and feel confused about social norms and appropriate behavioral patterns. The anomic state of mind, as we argued in our theoretical assumptions, may be the direct product of structural strains where old and new systems coexist and contend, and pressure individuals to take on conflicting roles. An excellent example of this is cited by J. Galtung wherein a man has taken a role of a father within a traditional village and, simultaneously, works in a modern factory which requires him to take a completely different role with a distinctive set of values.

Measurements

Forty-three items were designed in our 1996 questionnaire for measuring individual anomie. Some of the items were taken directly from a well-established anomie scale in

the field. The adaptation of such a universal scale to China's situation was not difficult since the phenomenon, in our view, is transcultural. However, we maintain that people are more likely to develop feelings of anomie when they are going through system transitions which gives them conflicting signals about what to believe and how to act. In Table 21, we present a sample of items on individual anomie. For items not included in the sample list, refer to Appendix III.

Table 21: A Sample of Attitude Questions Tapping Respondents' Individual Anomie:

Set One: Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 5, how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:	
Q27	Policies and reforms are beyond our ordinary citizens. It is useless to be part of it.
Q28	Things are changing so fast. It is hard to tell right from wrong these days.
Q29	I'm very pessimistic when thinking about the future.
Q30	Each one sweeps the snow from his own doorstep and doesn't bother about the frost on his neighbor's roof.
Q31	Means justify the ends as long as we can solve the problems.
Q32	Laws should be strictly followed in whatever we are doing.
Q33	One cannot achieve his/her full potential unless s/he attains knowledge through school.
Q34	Making money overrides everything even over a good education.
Q35	You may be able to influence government decision-making through expressing your opinions and an active participation in political activities.
Q36	Friends can be easily found around us whom you can trust.
Q37	Enjoy life while you can and tomorrow will take care of itself.
Q38	A dream is always achievable in our society if one works hard on it.
Set Two: If bribery can get whatever you want, do you think you will pay your way too?	
Q39	Absolutely I will do it.
Q40	Probably I will do it.
Q41	It depends on the situation.
Q42	Probably I will not do it.
Q43	I will absolutely not do it.
Q44	I don't know.
Note:	Questions in Table 4.1 represent a selected list only. For the complete questionnaire see Appendix III on the Anomie Item Pool at the back of this monograph.

The questions in Set One in Table 21 asked the respondents to indicate on a scale of 1 to 5 how much they agree or disagree with the listed statements. Low values represent low agreement while high values indicate high agreement. Items in Set Two were devised with the specific Chinese situation in mind. The assumption behind the inclusion of these

items was that with the economic reforms underway, money becomes the driving force in every day life. Thus we may be able to find out how far people are willing to go in giving up their traditional values for new values. However, all the items were eventually dropped from scale construction.

Results

To analyze the anomie scale, we start with selecting individual survey items for inclusion in the scale by investigating item correlations. This analysis is then followed by statistical tests for scale unidimensionality and internal consistency.

Item Analysis

Through item analysis we were able to reduce our original anomie pool to six items. Each selected item was reframed into a complete sentence and given an item number for easy identification in our table presentation to follow.

ITEM27: *How much do you agree with the statement: Enjoy life while you can and tomorrow will take care of itself.*

ITEM28: *How much do you agree with the statement: Policies and reforms are beyond our ordinary citizens. It is useless to be part of it.*

ITEM29: *How much do you agree with the statement: Each one sweeps the snow from his own doorstep and doesn't bother about the frost on his neighbor's roof.*

ITEM31: *How much do you agree with the statement: Making money overrides every thing even over a good education.*

ITEM32: *How much do you agree with the statement: Means justify the ends as long as we can solve problems.*

ITEM33: *How much do you agree with the statement: Nowadays things change so fast that it is hard to tell right from wrong.*

Table 22: Pearson's Correlation Coefficients Matrix of Anomie Items:

(n) = 3983	27	28	29	31	32	33
Item27	1.00					
Item28	.349	1.00				
Item29	.534	.383	1.00			
Item31	.286	.241	.287	1.00		
Item32	.194	.181	.185	.240	1.00	
Item33	.286	.401	.350	.153	.149	1.00

The item correlation coefficients in Table 22 reveal modest to strong associations between the six anomie items. The Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the six scale items yielded a raw item alpha value of .70 and a standardized item alpha value of .70, indicating a respectable internal consistency among the items. We take this evidence to reflect the common construct we hypothesized they shared.

To identify the core elements in the pessimism scale, factor analysis was used. The results of the factor procedure are presented in Table 23. All six items were loaded on to

one factor which we interpreted as representing individual's level of anomie. The factor has an eigenvalue of 2.46 and explains 41 percent of variance.

Table 23: Item Loading for Principal Components Analysis of Individual Anomie Scale:

Item No	Variables	Factor Loading Individual Anomie
Item29	Take care by your own	.755
Item27	Be content and enjoy only today	.726
Item28	Unable participate policies	.679
Item33	Hard to tell right and wrong	.601
Item31	Making money is every thing	.540
Item32	Resolve problem with any mean	.428
	Eigenvalue	2.46
	Variance Explained (%)	40.9

Homogeneity of Factors

Table 4.4 below presents the results of the item-total and item-remainder calculations. Note that the six item alpha shows a relative high degree of stability in item alpha when individual items are dropped from the set. We therefore conclude that the six items constitute a good measurement of individual anomie.

Table 24: Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha for Individual Anomie Items

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Item- Total Correlation	Corrected Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
Item27	13.5264	9.7193	.5174	.3293	.6341
Item28	12.9282	9.4115	.4826	.2600	.6441
Item29	13.4751	9.4642	.5491	.3612	.6228
Item31	13.6435	10.6048	.3643	.1463	.6816
Item32	12.9607	10.8696	.2784	.0874	.7094
Item33	12.7368	10.3752	.4127	.2123	.6672

Reliability Coefficients 6 items
Alpha = .7010; Standardized item alpha = .7013

Discussion

Overall, we conclude that our individual anomie scale of six items supports our conceptual assumptions and provides a nice fit to our data. By combining the total item scores and dividing by the number of items in the set, we have a scale mean of 2.64, a mode of 2.33, a median of 2.67, a standard deviation of .62, and a range of 4.0 as showed in Table 25. These statistics suggest a normal distribution of the scale.

Table 25: Individual Anomie Scale Statistics from 1996 China Survey

n = 3997

Measures of Scale Central Tendency	
Mean	2.64
Mode	2.33
Median	2.67
Measures of Scale Spread	
Standard Deviation	.62
Minimum	1.00
Maximum	5.00
Range	4.00
Scale Distribution	
Skewness	.345
Kurtosis	.137

1.5 A Summary

This section presents a summary of what we have discussed in the scale development. The criteria of the scale construction, as specified in our early report on the conceptualization of the research, included that it be simple, easy to use, sensitive, and with some degree of generalizability. The final product of the scale with eight core elements and thirty-two nation-specific indicators, in our view, meets the basic standards we set up for the scale in the following respects: the scale contains only a few simple items and could be easily administrated to a general public through a fairly concise survey questionnaire. The scale, moreover, covered a wide range of issues for a nation in transition and may be administered to a population other than the test area using core domains of the scale. The following is a complete list of the instrument of what we labeled "A Potential Social Warning Instrument."

The four scales contain two levels of generalization: nation-specific indicators and core indicators. Measurements at the latter level were considered to have some broader implication than those at the former level. The elements marked with a * within each of the four scales are our core elements and the items in italics are nation-specific indicators used in our 1996 China survey.

1.6 A Potential Social Warning Instrument

Scales and components with * are the core elements in warning scale.

Items in *italics* are national indicators specific to China.

Discontent Scale

INDIVIDUAL DISSATISFACTION *
(Three Nation-Specific Items):

Item1: *Comparing yourself with others in the society, are you basically satisfied with your monetary income from work?*

Item2: *Comparing yourself with others in the society, are you basically satisfied with the social esteem you get from the society?*

Item3: *Comparing yourself with others in the society, are you basically satisfied with the employment security/social benefits package you get from the society?*

SYSTEM DISCONTENT *
(Six Nation-Specific Items):

Item4: Overall, the gap between the rich and the poor is widening to an unf*air* extent.

Item5: Inflation is going up out of control.

Item6: The present political corruption is becoming a social epidemic.

Item7: Nowadays there are no clear moral standards in the society.

Item8: It is hard to find a crime-free place to live.

Item9: There is no such thing as democracy or a legal system in our country.

Distrust Scale

How would you assess government's capability in dealing with the following political, economic, and social problems:

GOVERNMENT'S COMPETENCE IN DEALING WITH POLITICAL ISSUES *
(Three Nation-Specific Items):

Item10: Capability to curtail high crime rate.

Item11: Capability to maintain a stable society.

Item12: Capability to expose and punish political corruption.

GOVERNMENT'S COMPETENCE IN DEALING WITH ECONOMIC ISSUES *
(Three Nation-Specific Items):

Item13: Capability to contain earning inequality.

Item14: Capability to reduce unemployment.

Item15: Capability to regulate price rise.

GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY IN DEALING WITH SOCIAL ISSUES *
(Five Nation-Specific Items):

Item16: Capability to create a democratic atmosphere.

Item17: Capability to protect the environment.

Item18: Capability to regulate rural-urban migration.

Item19: Capability to uphold traditional values.

Item20: Capability to ease urban housing problems.

Pessimism Scale

ESTIMATION OF PAST MOBILITY *
(Three Nation-Specific Items):

Item21: *Compare yourself with previous 2 – 3 years, do you see any improvement in your monetary earnings?*

Item22: Compare yourself with previous 2 – 3 years, do you see any improvement in terms of your social esteem?

Item23: Compare yourself with previous 2 – 3 years, do you see any improvement regarding to the employment security/benefits package you get from the society?

ANTICIPATED MOBILITY IN THE FUTURE *
(Three Nation-Specific Items):

Item24: Personally I don't see any future for myself.

Item25: I don't feel optimistic about the directions we are going.

Item26: In our country, opportunity is not always available to those who try to strive ahead.

Individual Anomie Scale

** Tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following sayings:*
(Six Nation-Specific Items):

Item27: Enjoy life while you can and tomorrow will take care of itself.

Item28: Policies and reforms are beyond our ordinary citizens. It is useless to be part of it.

Item29: Each one sweeps the snow from his own doorstep and doesn't bother about the frost on his neighbor's roof.

Item31: Making money overrides everything even a good education.

Item32: The means justify the ends as long as we can solve problems.

Item33: Nowadays things change so fast that it is hard to tell right from wrong.

2 China at Crossroads

In Part I we discussed the importance of an instrument measuring elements of social instability as an early warning system and devised the scale instrument with four constructs, eight core components, and thirty-two nation-specific indicators. Here in Part II, we will discuss the results of this instrument which was included in our 1996 survey of urban dwellers in China.

We maintain the following propositions: (1) the current Economic Reform has brought China to a state of transition where socialist politics/control coexist and contend with capitalist free markets at the system-level; (2) these stressful and confusing circumstances has exerted some negative effect on the sentiments and morale of urban dwellers, thus spawning elements of social instability; and (3) elements of instability, however, are unlikely to be distributed evenly across the society since individuals may have been influenced differently by social occurrences and events.

In Section 1 we will discuss the stressful and confusing circumstances individuals are facing in contemporary China. In Section 2 we will investigate elements of social instability among city dwellers as measured by the Social Warning Instrument. In Section 3 we will present a summary discussion of the findings from Section 1 and Section 2.

2.1 China and System Transformation

As previously stated, great social and economic transitions are often accompanied by structural strains when old and new systems coexist and contend. This situation is thought to produce a train of disorientation, confusion, and uncertainty among the people facing such conditions. We consider China, during the years of Reform, to be a case in point.

Starting in late 1970s, China has opened its door to the West and embarked on a road to becoming a rich and prosperous socialist country. Since then, China has not only joined the world community but its economy has become the globe's third largest. In 1996 alone, China acquired nearly $40 billion in capital from abroad and lured more foreign investment than any other developing nation. It is already a formidable force in international trade ranking 11th in the world in exports (*Time,* March 3, 1997:53). However, China has to face a number of fundamental problems that come with its economical miracle. At the root of its problems is the incompatibility of the two systems: socialist dogma and its rigid political control versus capitalist free-market.

Officially, China claims to be a socialist country and has vowed to remain a socialist country for generations to come. Indeed it possesses every essential characteristic of a typical socialist system. In its political arena, there is a one-party ruling system and decision-making on key issues is highly concentrated or even personalized. There is no independent legal or judicial system in place. In its economy, public ownership of property is dominant. There is a powerful state plan and the deep-seated disrespect for free contracts and the rights of individual property. In its belief system, China adheres to Marxist ideology. It believes in a paradise of common wealth and prosperity. Collective-oriented behavior is emphasized at the expense of individual choice. Traditional values of

harmony and mutual assistance are still strongly encouraged and promoted by the government.

However, in the drive for modernization, China opened itself to the capitalist free-market that embraces many ideas and practices that conflict with traditional socialism. For example, a free-market economy is widely associated with individuals acting out of self-interest, rather than in the interests of the collective and society. Furthermore, freedom of choice, dominance of private property rights, and stable government by law and election are some of the essential conditions of this free-market system.

To embrace the free-market system in a socialist country, China has invented what is popularly known as “a socialism with Chinese characteristics” or a “Two-Track System.” On the socialist track, China has to maintain the four principles in its modernization drive: Marxist ideology, the socialist road, rule of Communist Party, and the people’s democratic dictatorship. On the other track, China allows the free-market to take over part of its economy by dismantling the people’s communes in its countryside. In addition, China has allowed private business to operate and the privatization of some of its state-run enterprises in the cities. As a result, economic liberation spread through the land, sparking a national growth at an average of 10% since the Reform. In the cities, private enterprises and joint ventures have expanded from 1.8% and 1.2% in the 1980s to make up 13.2% and 13.1% of the national economy respectively, while state-run enterprises have reduced from over 90% to 73.7% of the national economy (Statistical Survey of China, 1996, p. 4). In the countryside, the market mechanism has greatly boosted labor productivity and has freed millions upon millions of farmers from land work. Thanks to this economic liberation, people’s living standards have diversified and risen steadily and immensely. Personal savings have jumped over sixtyfold in the past decade.

However, this picture of the two-track system is not as favorable upon closer inspection. Before the introduction of free-market ideas, China was poor but everyone was more or less equal. But now, the gap between the rich and the poor is widening not only at the personal-level, but also between the rural and urban areas, and among the cities in different regions. Unemployment is increasing at an unprecedented pace as ailing state enterprises operate with debt and surplus labor. Official corruption is rampant at all levels of government in an absence of an independent judicial system. The country is disturbed by migrant labor and a climbing crime rate. Rapid economic development and unplanned construction have created almost terminal environmental problems. The dissatisfaction with traditional and socialist values has left a moral and spiritual vacuum. The cry for democracy and law grows louder and louder.

In retrospect, we see many contradictions within the two-track system. At the core of these conflicts is the combination of socialist dogma and political control with the free-market economy. We see people facing this paradoxical situation with confusion, disillusion, and disorientation. We see popular discontent, distrust, anomie, and pessimism among the Chinese people growing as a result.

Accordingly, we put forward our propositions about this system’s negative effect upon the people living under the current so-called Two-Track System. First, we expect the level of social discontent to be higher under a dual system because of the confusion and disagreement created by the government’s conflicting policies, and/or the conflicting situations created by the coexistence of old and new socio-economic stratification systems. Second, we expect people to have little confidence in the government as it is the sole delivery mechanism for promised personal and national prosperity. This high level of

expectation will lead to a low estimate of the government's capability to deal with the emerging issues in the system transformation. Third, we expect that public resentment of the mobility structure will be greater if the leaders of the nation have raised the public expectation through reforming promises. Fourth, we expect that more people will take on an apathetical view toward both self and life amidst confusion and disorientation from the conflicting systems. Overall, we expect the economic reforms in 1996 China would bring about a potential public temperament characterized by increased level of discontent, distrust, pessimism, and anomie. This general disapproving attitude among the city residents would send out signals of system instability and called for system adjustment and reorientation.

We conclude that for system adjustment to occur, the leaders of China have to come to terms with the fundamental contradictions intrinsic in its Two-Track System. However, one may argue that China can survive under the current Two-Track System of economic prosperity and political rigidity as long as people's material expectations continue to be met. To some degree it is true that there is no turning away from the free-market track for China's leaders as their legitimacy of ruling rests, in part, on the economic well-being of their people. However, can China continue to prosper if market forces are kept outside the state run enterprises which employ a labor force of well over 100 million people and are running with glaring inefficiency and sometimes at a loss? If, for instance, China lets market forces take over completely, how can it exercise effectively its political control over the masses when it loses its material basis for control? What will occur if the affluent members of society demand freedoms beyond economic issues? The leaders of present China have to tackle these issues sooner or later as the stability of the system will inevitably be contingent upon the government's reactions to those fundamental strains at system-level.

2.2 Elements of Social Instability in Chinese Cities

This section presents the instrument administration on the Chinese urban population. Given that China is in a state of transition where incompatible systems coexist and contend, we expect this stressful and confusing circumstance to have some negative effects on the people living through it. We will investigate elements of social instability across social and demographic groups in urban China in 1996. We have organized our findings into four parts: (a) the research sample; (b) differences across social and demographic groups; (c) differences across cities, regions, and other areas; and (d) differences between socioeconomic (SES) groups.

Description of Research Sample

Respondents' demographic and socioeconomic status (SES) characteristics in our sample are displayed in Table A (refer to Appendix I for sampling methods and discussion). Each gender is essentially represented equally, approximating that of China's total population in 1996. Income is reported by its mean and standard deviation because there is no common, sensible classification standards for low, medium, and high income levels at present in China. Respondents in the sample were predominantly married (91%), had a high school education (Senior 38% and Junior 28%), and working in a public ownership workplace (82%). These figures approximate the national statistics in 1996 China despite our initial efforts to enhance our sample variability by having a larger proportion of respondents working in enterprises and agencies with private ownership or

collective ownership. Our sampled respondents are more likely to have college education than the rest of the national population. We believe the sample versus population difference in college education is due to the rural-urban difference. It is a well-known fact that children in rural China have limited access to good education from elementary and high school. Note that our 1996 sample was drawn from predominantly urban areas in China, thus it may have a somewhat limited implication for rural areas.

Table 26: Demographic and SES Characteristics of the Respondents Who Completed1996 Survey Questionnaire
n = 3997

Variable	**N**	**%**
Gender (%)		
Male	2062	51.6
Female	1935	48.4
Marital Status (%)		
Single	292	7.3
Married	3622	90.6
Widowed	45	1.1
Divorced	38	1.0
Educational Achievement (%)		
MA or Ph.D.	57	1.4
BA	307	7.7
College	811	20.4
Senior High	1493	37.5
Junior High	1115	28.0
Primary	172	4.3
Below Primary	24	.6
Work Unit Type by Ownership (%)		
State Ownership	3268	82.3
Collective Ownership	532	13.4
United Ownership	8	.2
Private Venture	48	1.2
Joint-Venture	59	1.5
Others	54	1.4
Political Affiliation (%)		
Party Member	1284	32.1
Youth League Member	342	8.6
Other Parties	34	.9
Non-Party Affiliation	2325	58.2
Occupational Groupings (%)		
Service Personnel	217	5.4
Worker	1132	28.4
Office Staff / Secretary	416	10.4
Sales / Business Personnel	222	5.6
Finance Staff	619	15.5
Teacher	201	5.0
Cadres	642	16.1
Scientist	540	13.5
Variable	Mean	SD
Age (years)	42.0	10.93
Monthly Income (in *Renminbi Yuan*)	560	243.5

Elements of Instability Across Socio-Demographic Groups

To explore elements of social instability among China's demographic and social groups, we performed tests of difference of means (*t*-test and ANOVA) using the four social warning scales as dependent variables. In our presentation below, we will start with a few comments on each table and proceed with the actual tables at the end of our brief discussion. We choose to present our findings in subscale format which, we believe, may be more meaningful to our readers. For those groupings that are indigenous to China, such as workplace rank and party affiliation, some background explanations are presented.

Notes on reading the Tables below

As previously mentioned, we expected that elements of social instability are unlikely to be distributed evenly across the socio-economic groups in 1996 urban China. The explore elements of social instability we performed tests on mean difference (*t*-test and ANOVA), using our four subscales as dependent variable. The 11 tables below present the results of the mean tests. The tables also include the results from Bonferroni tests to specify which means are significantly different from another.

The results for the Bonferroni tests are marked with superscript notation to indicate group differences, except for Table 36 and Table 37 where the number of categories makes this system unwieldy. When means are accompanied by the same letter (such as .4a and .5a or .5b and .6b), this denotes that the means for the categories are not significantly different from each other. When different letters are used (such as .4a and .6b), this denotes a significant difference between the means of the categories. If a mean in a Bonferroni test is accompanied by multiple letters (such as $.5^{a,b}$), this denotes that this figure is not significantly different from the categories with either of these same letters. This last condition often occurs when three categories of a variable are compared, and one mean is located between the other two, but not significantly different from either. When no letters accompany any of the means across a single subscale, this indicates that there are no differences between any of the categories of the independent variable. We performed the Bonferroni tests with the significance level set at .05. For Tables 9 and 12, this method of superscript notation becomes cumbersome with many categories of the independent variable, so we include a matrix for each relevant subscale to show the significant differences between categories.

Gender and Elements of Social Instability (Table 27)

Table 27 reveals significant gender differences across the four subscales: discontent, distrust, pessimism, and individual anomie. In each case, females tend to show greater unhappiness and disapproval than males. While the gender difference on the measure of distrust in the government's capability is smaller than the other differences, all results here are significant at the .05 level.

Age and Elements of Social Instability (Table 28)

We adapted the standard classification by the Chinese Statistical Bureau in our grouping of the age groups: (1) 18 to 35 years of age; (2) 36 to 50 years of age and (3) over 50 years of age. (Chinese Statistical Bureau(CSB): 1% Chinese Census Survey, 1996) Table 28 shows the influence of age on the four subscales. The clear trend here is that older people (over 50 years of age) tend to show less unhappiness and dissatisfaction than both younger and middle-aged people. Older people indicate significantly less discontent

and anomie than the other two age groups (32.6 vs. 33.8 and 33.6, and 15.2 vs.16.1 and 16.0). On the other two subscales, older people still indicate less distrust and pessimism about mobility but not all of these differences are significant (differences are not significant at the .05 level between older people and middle-aged people on the distrust measure and between older people and younger people on the pessimism measure). Stated differently, younger people and middle-aged people tend to hold very similar (negative) attitudes in terms of discontent, distrust in government, and individual anomie. These two younger age groups only differ in terms of their attitudes toward mobility in China, with middle-aged people more likely to be more pessimistic.

Level of Education and Elements of Social Instability (Table 29)

In our 1996 survey, respondents were asked to give their highest educational attainments in one of the following seven categories: (1) less than primary school; (2) completed primary school; (3) completed junior middle school; (4) completed senior middle school; (5) completed two-year college; (6) university graduate; and (7) MA degree and above. Our 1996 sample consists of: 4.9% of primary school and less; 28% of junior middle school; 37.5% of senior middle school; 20.4% of college; and 9.1% above. In our analysis, the education variable was grouped into a three-point ordinal scale: low (primary school and below); medium (completed junior school); and high (completed high school and above).

Table 3 shows that education has a significant effect on three of the four subscales, with the measure of discontent being the exception. On the other three subscales, there are fairly linear trends with amount of education but these trends vary across scales. Level of education is positively associated with distrust in government, with those with the highest levels of education having the greatest distrust in the government. The difference between the two lower education groups, however, is not significant at the .05 level. For the other two subscales, education has a negative association: lower education is associated with both greater pessimism about the mobility structure and greater degree of individual anomie. The education differences on these two subscales are all significant at the .05 level. The dilemma with education seems to be that higher education tends to be associated with an increase in questioning the social order (perhaps on an ideological level) while lower education seems to increase the likelihood of facing economic constraints and estrangement from important decision-making. Neither of the above trends seem to encourage approval of the current system.

Political Affiliation and Elements of Social Instability (Table 30)

China is ruled by one party: the Communist Party. By becoming a member of the Party, one pledges his or her loyalty to the Party and all it stands for, at least in name. In return, party members in different walks of life are treated favorably. We expected that a Party member would reveal less discontent, a higher level of trust in the government, approval of the mobility structure, and low anomie. However, this may not be true if the party ideology is losing control over its members under the wave of market economy.

Table 4 shows the effects of political affiliation on the four subscales. Interestingly, there seems to be no difference between party members and non-party members in terms of distrust in government, although we might expect non-party members to be more distrustful. Otherwise, non-party members indicate higher levels of dissatisfaction on the three other subscales than party members: Non-party members show higher discontent, greater pessimism about their mobility, and greater anomie. Party membership, then,

seems to cultivate stronger ties to the current system. Because of their participation within the system, party members may have a better understanding of how inefficiently the system works, and may be less frustrated by it.

Ownership and Elements of Social Instability (Table 31)

Urban people in China work in different types of workplaces: workplaces of public ownership and workplaces of non-public ownership. Public ownership was and still is the dominant type of workplace where employees used to get a better deal from the state or government who owned and operated the workplace. However, things are changing since the Economic Reform. Those working in private or joint ventures are not only getting higher pay (sometimes 10 times more than those working in other places) but also relatively higher job security. We suspect that people in private and joint ventures benefit more financially from the current economic reform and thus are less likely to become elements of social instability.

Table 5 shows the effects of the two types of workplace ownership (public versus non-public) on the four subscales. At the .05 level of significance, the group difference on the discontent measure is not significant, although the non-public ownership group tends to score slightly higher (this figure would be significant at the .10 level). The public ownership group tends to have greater distrust of the government, while the non-public ownership group tends to score higher on the pessimism and anomie measures. As with Table 4, proximity to government (party membership, and now public ownership) does not increase trust in the government as might be expected. Here in Table 5, nearness to the workings of government produces greater distrust. However, and this too parallels the findings in Table 4, separation from government (non-public ownership in Table 5) increases dissatisfaction with one's station in society.

Employment Status and Elements of Social Instability (Table 32)

Large scale unemployment is a relatively new phenomenon in China and it is in conflict with the socialist ideology of the supremacy of labor. What is ironic is the fact that political correct or not, jobs and positions are no longer safe at state-operated workplaces. Unemployment happens at least as often to the public sectors as to the private sectors. Our 1996 survey shows a 3 percent (147 respondents) unemployment rate among our respondents. We suspect that the unemployed may indicate a stronger level of resentment on all four measures of social instability.

The relationships between employment status and the four subscales reveal two significant associations. Unemployed workers are both more discontented and more pessimistic than their employed counterparts. Unemployed workers were not significantly different from employed workers in terms of distrust in government or individual anomie. Employment, as might be expected, seems to be most influential in determining individual attitudes of personal satisfaction and opinions toward improving economic life chances. While Table 5 showed types of ownership to be effectual upon distrust in government and individual anomie, we find gross employment status (Table 6) to have no effect upon these constructs.

Respondent's Monthly Income and Elements of Instability (Table 33)

For decades since the founding of PRC, China has the reputation of enforcing an egalitarian income distribution system. This is, however, no longer true since the

Economic Reform in the late 1970s: private ownership has grown by leaps and bounds; the national wage system has collapsed; and bonus rewards have been introduced that have linked individual rewards with individual performance and enterprise profits. The increasing differentiation of monetary incomes among urbanites in recent years makes monthly income a valid measure of social inequality. Our survey instrument asked respondents to report their current monthly income in *renminbi yuan* and it prompted the respondents to include their basic income, various steady bonuses, subsidies, and incomes from other sources into their monthly and total yearly amounts.

The mean self-reported monthly income of our 1996 respondents was 560 *yuan,* with a mode and a median of 500 yuan. Income ranged from 30 *yuan* to 2500 *yuan*. The shape of income distribution has a curve with positive skewness. This constitutes a differential ratio of 1:83, one that is thirty times larger than that prior to the Economic Reform. We consider this difference large enough to characterize China as a differentiating society. We also created three income categories by drawing a 0.5 standard deviation band around the mean income: 560 yuan. Thus we have three groups on this income variable: the low income people below this band with an income range from 30 to 439 *yuan*; the high income people above this band with an income range from the 682 to 2500 *yuan;* and middle income people of the band around mean with an income range from the 440 *yuan* to 681 *yuan.*

Table 7 reveals three significant outcomes, with the exception being the results found in relation to the distrust measure. The significant results on the other subscales show essentially negative associations with respondent monthly income. In each case, higher income is associated with greater satisfaction (less discontent, less pessimism, and less anomie). Lower income, then, is associated with greater discontent, dimmer views of mobility, and higher levels of anomie. While this general negative association trend holds in each case, the difference between middle and high income groups is not significant on the anomie measure. These results echo the findings on Table 6, except in the case of anomie. Perhaps the finer distinctions made with respect to income (three attributes) allow for individual anomie differences to be discovered, where the dichotomized employment status variable masks differences in anomie. Distrust in government does not seem to be affected by either employment status or income, perhaps indicating some separation between economic and political life.

Employee's Danwei Rank and Elements of Instability (Table 34)

China has a very complicated workplace organization hierarchy from the central government down to the grassroots agencies. People affiliated with higher ranking workplaces at the central government level enjoy more power and prestige, easier access to social and economic resources, and better chances for personal promotions. We expect that the rank of one's workplace plays an important role in shaping social, economic, and political attitudes.

In Table 8, the results are not as uniform as on the previous two tables dealing with employment status (Table 6) and monthly income (Table 7). On the discontent measure, middle ranking respondents scored highest and high ranking respondents scored the lowest. Low ranking respondents were located between these two extremes, not significantly different from either middle or high ranking respondents. High ranking respondents, on average, also scored lowest on both the pessimism measure and the anomie measure. For both pessimism and anomie, low ranking respondents scored the highest with middle ranking respondents between high and low ranking respondents

(although on the anomie measure, middle and high ranking respondents are not significantly different). The distrust measure is different in relation to employee ranking, as high ranking respondents tended to score the highest, middle ranking respondents slightly less (though not significantly different), and low ranking respondents, on average, scored the lowest. In using employee rank, the most consistently linear (and probably expected) results were found on the pessimism and anomie measures. On the distrust measure, we find a result which jibes with the earlier finding with education: higher education tends to be associated with greater distrust in the government.

Occupation and Elements of Social Instability (Table 35)

In China, individuals are usually associated with one of the five major types of occupations: peasant, worker, intellectual, cadre, or soldier. In our China survey, the standard occupation classification from the Chinese Statistical Bureau has been used. Since our sample was drawn from cities only, we had automatically excluded peasants and soldiers from our study. We grouped 14 major occupations into following 6 categories: Worker, Office Staff, Business Staff, Finance Staff, Intelectual and Cadres. Our assumption about workers is that since the reform has affected them mostly in a negative direction, they may become the most resentful segment of the population. We anticipated cadres and intellectuals may give a higher estimation of their current situations and a higher approval rating to government policies.

Table 35 shows the differences between six categories of occupational on the four subscales. Fairly consistent results are found on the pessimism and anomie measures. Here, workers and business staff consistently score highest (greater pessimism and high levels of anomie), followed by (in order): finance staff, office staff, intellectuals, and cadres. On both of these measures, cadres scored (on average) the lowest, with only intellectuals not significantly different. With discontent as the dependent variable, the only significant differences were between cadres and both workers and intellectuals. As with the pessimism and anomie measures, we find that cadres tended to score the least (indicating the least amount of discontent, on average), and that workers tended to score near the top of occupational rank in terms of discontent. But for discontent (unlike the previous two measures), intellectuals also indicated a great deal of discontent. Office staff, business staff, and finance staff were not dissimilar from either worker and intellectuals or cadres. Occupations reacted much differently to the distrust in government measure. The only significant difference here is between workers (lowest level of distrust, on average) and intellectuals (highest level of distrust, on average). Intellectuals tending to score the highest on the distrust measure may reflect the earlier education results. Note that Table 36 presents significance matrices for the pessimism and individual anomie subscales, as the superscript notation becomes unwieldy with many categories of the independent variable.

Workers and Elements of Instability (Table 37)

To further test our assumptions about workers and elements of instability, we divided our sample of 2377 works into permanent, contract, and seasonal workers. We believe the permanent workers in our sample are still protected under the socialist track of the system while the non-permanent workers face the competitiveness of the free-market economy. Our intention was to investigate which sections of workers are more unhappy or more critical of the current system and policies.

Type of worker (permanent, contract, or seasonal) provides significant explanatory power only on the pessimism measure. There are no differences between these categories of worker on three of the subscales (the discontent, distrust, and anomie measures). On the pessimism measure, however, the results show a significant difference between permanent workers and contract workers, with permanent workers having a greater belief in limited mobility. Seasonal workers, according to the significance levels, are not different from either permanent or contract workers on the pessimism measure. This seems counter-intuitive as the mean score for seasonal workers is not in-between that for permanent and contract workers; the mean scores on the pessimism measure are: 18.19 for permanent workers; 17.76 for contract workers; and 18.72 for seasonal workers. This perceived anomaly probably has to do with the size of each group: 1692 permanent workers; 636 contract workers; and 46 seasonal workers. Thus, the confidence interval around the seasonal worker mean actually stretches around the two other means: the 95% confidence interval for the seasonal mean ranges from 17.45 to 19.98. A regrouping of worker status (such as permanent vs. non-permanent workers) has been suggested for further analysis.

Workplace Type and Elements of Instability (Table 38)

Workplace type in contemporary China can be put into three categories: administrative work units, public work units (or, in Western terms, non-profit institutions), and production work units. Examples of the first category are a party organ, a government agency, a judicial department, or a legislative body. Schools, hospitals, research institutes, broadcasting services and many other units in the spheres of education, social welfare, public health and culture belong to the second category of work units. Productive work units include those units engaged in the economic activities of the country, such as those in transportation, commerce, and industry. A factory, a bank, a taxi company or a coal mine are examples of this category.

Given the fact that people associated with non-profit organizations and Party/government organizations are more or less protected from the competitive forces of the free-market, they may feel less discontent, less anomie, but more restricted in mobility. Organization type as an independent variable yields significant differences on three of the four subscales with distrust in government being the exception. In the three cases of difference, respondents from profit organizations scored highest, exhibiting the most discontent, belief in limited mobility, and anomie. There were no statistical differences at the .05 level between respondents from non-profit organizations and party/government organizations. Perhaps there are certain pressures (e.g., economic) associated with profit organizations which lead individuals to feel greater dissatisfaction. These results could also be used to support an argument that "profit" as an organizational goal has no intrinsic value to the employees, whereas non-profit organizations and party/government organizations have (at least) symbolic goals of higher purpose which may be fulfilling for workers.

Table 27: Gender and elements of instability

	Male	Female
Discontent (n)	2062	1935
Mean	33.13	33.83
Standard Deviation	5.08	5.02
95% CI for Mean		
lower	32.91	33.61
upper	33.35	34.06
t-value		-4.34
df		3995
Sig. (2-tails)		.000
Distrust (n)	2062	1935
Mean	38.26	38.60
Standard Deviation	5.05	5.12
95% CI for Mean		
lower	38.04	38.37
upper	38.48	38.83
t-value		-2.11
df		3995
Sig. (2-tails)		.035
Pessimism (n)	2062	1932
Mean	17.53	18.10
Standard Deviation	3.49	3.58
95% CI for Mean		
lower	17.38	17.94
upper	17.68	18.26
t-value		-5.14
df		3992
Sig. (2-tails)		.000
Individual Anomie (n)	2062	1935
Mean	15.56	16.17
Standard Deviation	3.69	3.69
95% CI for Mean		
lower	15.40	16.00
upper	15.72	16.33
t-value		-5.22
df		3995
Sig. (2-tails)		.000

Table 28: Age and elements of instability

	18-35	**36-50**	**51 and above**
Discontent (n)	1009	2135	853
Mean	33.83[a]	33.63[a]	32.64[b]
Standard Deviation	4.94	5.01	5.23
95% CI for Mean			
lower	33.53	33.42	32.29
upper	34.14	33.84	32.99
F-ratio			15.21
df			2
Sig.			.000
Distrust (n)	1009	2135	853
Mean	38.65[a]	38.48[a,b]	38.04[b]
Standard Deviation	5.12	5.15	4.87
95% CI for Mean			
lower	38.33	38.26	37.71
upper	38.96	38.70	38.37
F-ratio			3.50
df			2
Sig.			.031
Pessimism (n)	1007	2134	853
Mean	17.49[a]	18.17[b]	17.27[a]
Standard Deviation	3.52	3.56	3.42
95% CI for Mean			
lower	17.28	18.02	17.04
upper	17.71	18.32	17.50
F-ratio			24.90
df			2
Sig.			.000
Individual Anomie (n)	1009	2135	853
Mean	16.05[a]	16.04[a]	15.16[b]
Standard Deviation	3.64	3.70	3.70
95% CI for Mean			
lower	15.83	15.88	14.91
upper	16.28	16.19	15.41
F-ratio			19.17
df			2
Sig.			.000

Table 29: Level Of Education And Elements Of Instability

	Low Educ	Medium Educ	High Educ
Discontent (n)	1311	1493	1175
Mean	33.61	33.35	33.47
Standard Deviation	5.17	5.00	5.00
95% CI for Mean			
lower	33.33	33.10	33.18
upper	33.89	33.60	33.75
F-ratio			.900
df			2
Sig.			.407
Distrust (n)	1311	1493	1175
Mean	37.97[a]	38.39[a]	38.97[b]
Standard Deviation	5.26	4.93	4.99
95% CI for Mean			
lower	37.69	38.14	38.69
upper	38.26	38.64	39.26
F-ratio			12.22
df			2
Sig.			.000
Pessimism (n)	1310	1491	1175
Mean	18.47[a]	17.81[b]	17.06[c]
Standard Deviation	3.71	3.60	3.13
95% CI for Mean			
lower	18.27	17.63	16.88
upper	18.68	17.99	17.24
F-ratio			50.75
df			2
Sig.			.000
Individual Anomie (n)	1311	1493	1175
Mean	16.41[a]	15.91[b]	15.15[c]
Standard Deviation	3.79	3.71	3.48
95% CI for Mean			
lower	16.21	15.72	14.95
upper	16.62	16.10	15.35
F-ratio			37.19
df			2
Sig.			.000

Table 30: Political Affiliation And Elements Of Instability

	Party Member	Non-Party Member
Discontent (n)	1626	2359
Mean	33.04	33.78
Standard Deviation	5.07	5.03
95% CI for Mean		
lower	32.80	33.57
upper	33.29	33.98
t-value		-4.55
df		3983
Sig. (2-tails)		.000
Distrust (n)	1626	2359
Mean	38.50	38.38
Standard Deviation	4.80	5.28
95% CI for Mean		
lower	38.27	38.17
upper	38.73	38.59
t-value		.74
df		3983
Sig. (2-tails)		.462
Pessimism (n)	1624	2358
Mean	17.04	18.33
Standard Deviation	3.35	3.57
95% CI for Mean		
lower	16.87	18.19
upper	17.20	18.48
t-value		-11.53
df		3980
Sig. (2-tails)		.000
Individual Anomie (n)	1626	2359
Mean	15.10	16.37
Standard Deviation	3.53	3.73
95% CI for Mean		
lower	14.92	16.22
upper	15.27	16.52
t-value		-10.82
df		3995
Sig. (2-tails)		.000

Table 31: Ownership And Elements Of Instability

	Public Ownership	Non-Public Ownership
Discontent (n)	3268	701
Mean	33.41	33.77
Standard Deviation	5.05	5.06
95% CI for Mean		
lower	33.24	33.40
upper	33.59	34.15
t-value		-1.70
df		3967
Sig. (2-tails)		.089
Distrust (n)	3268	701
Mean	38.55	37.82
Standard Deviation	5.02	5.34
95% CI for Mean		
lower	38.38	37.43
upper	38.73	38.22
t-value		3.46
df		3967
Sig. (2-tails)		.001
Pessimism (n)	3266	701
Mean	17.60	18.78
Standard Deviation	3.45	3.78
95% CI for Mean		
lower	17.48	18.50
upper	17.72	19.06
t-value		-8.05
df		3965
Sig. (2-tails)		.000
Individual Anomie (n)	3268	701
Mean	15.75	16.31
Standard Deviation	3.68	3.78
95% CI for Mean		
lower	15.63	16.03
upper	15.88	16.59
t-value		-3.62
df		3967
Sig. (2-tails)		.000

Table 32: Employment Status And Elements Of Instability

	Employed Workers	Unemployed Workers
Discontent (n)	2331	147
Mean	33.49	34.82
Standard Deviation	5.06	5.14
95% CI for Mean		
lower	33.29	33.98
upper	33.70	35.65
t-value		-3.07
df		2476
Sig. (2-tails)		.002
Distrust (n)	2331	147
Mean	38.35	38.12
Standard Deviation	5.17	5.52
95% CI for Mean		
lower	38.14	37.22
upper	38.56	39.02
t-value		.53
df		2476
Sig. (2-tails)		.60
Pessimism (n)	2328	147
Mean	18.07	20.15
Standard Deviation	3.59	4.00
95% CI for Mean		
lower	17.93	19.50
upper	18.22	20.80
t-value		-6.76
df		2473
Sig. (2-tails)		.000
Individual Anomie (n)	2331	147
Mean	16.19	16.39
Standard Deviation	3.68	4.39
95% CI for Mean		
lower	16.04	15.68
upper	16.34	17.11
t-value		.63
df		2476
Sig. (2-tails)		.528

Table 33: Respondent's Monthly Income And Elements Of Instability

unit: yuan	**30-439**	**440-681**	**682-2500**
Discontent (n)	1276	1697	1024
Mean	34.48[a]	33.51[b]	32.13[c]
Standard Deviation	5.15	4.90	4.90
95% CI for Mean			
lower	34.20	33.28	31.83
upper	34.77	33.75	32.43
F-ratio			63.36
df			2
Sig.			.000
Distrust (n)	1276	1697	1024
Mean	38.50	38.54	38.16
Standard Deviation	5.20	5.15	4.81
95% CI for Mean			
lower	38.21	38.29	37.86
upper	38.79	38.78	38.45
F-ratio			1.97
df			2
Sig.			.140
Pessimism (n)	1273	1697	1024
Mean	19.09[a]	17.70[b]	16.38[c]
Standard Deviation	3.83	3.26	3.03
95% CI for Mean			
lower	18.88	17.55	16.20
upper	19.30	17.86	16.57
F-ratio			181.44
df			2
Sig.			.000
Individual Anomie (n)	1276	1697	1024
Mean	16.40[a]	15.72[b]	15.40[b]
Standard Deviation	3.83	3.64	3.54
95% CI for Mean			
lower	16.19	15.55	15.18
upper	16.61	15.89	15.61
F-ratio			23.07
df			2
Sig.			.000

Table 34: Employee's danwei rank and elements of instability

	Low Rank	Middle Rank	High Rank
Discontent (n)	1294	1735	822
Mean	33.50[ab]	33.63[a]	33.10[b]
Standard Deviation	5.09	5.00	5.09
95% CI for Mean			
lower	33.22	33.39	32.76
upper	33.78	33.86	33.45
F-ratio			3.00
df			2
Sig.			.050
Distrust (n)	1294	1753	822
Mean	37.85[a]	38.71[b]	38.79[b]
Standard Deviation	5.10	5.09	4.92
95% CI for Mean			
lower	37.57	38.47	38.46
upper	38.13	38.94	39.13
F-ratio			13.22
df			2
Sig.			.000
Pessimism (n)	1292	1753	822
Mean	18.20[a]	17.80[b]	17.19[c]
Standard Deviation	3.73	3.46	3.30
95% CI for Mean			
lower	17.99	17.64	16.96
upper	18.40	17.96	17.41
F-ratio			20.65
df			2
Sig.			.000
Individual Anomie (n)	1294	1753	822
Mean	16.22[a]	15.72[b]	15.51[b]
Standard Deviation	3.71	3.69	3.63
95% CI for Mean			
lower	16.02	15.55	15.26
upper	16.42	15.89	15.76
F-ratio			11.14
df			2
Sig.			.000

Table 35: Occupation and elements of instability

	Worker	Office Staff	Business Staff	Finance Staff	Intellec-tual	Cadres
Discontent (n)	1349	416	222	619	741	642
Mean	33.77[b]	33.20[ab]	33.79[ab]	33.42[ab]	33.73[b]	32.68[a]
Standard Deviation	5.12	4.95	5.35	5.21	4.86	4.88
95% CI for Mean						
lower	33.50	32.72	33.08	33.01	33.38	32.30
upper	34.04	33.68	34.50	33.83	34.08	33.06
F-ratio						4.92
df						5
Sig.						.000
Distrust (n)	1349	416	222	619	741	642
Mean	38.07[q]	38.40[ab]	38.41[ab]	38.78[ab]	38.83[b]	38.39[ab]
Standard Deviation	5.12	5.04	5.46	5.06	5.27	4.68
95% CI for Mean						
lower	37.80	37.92	37.69	38.38	38.45	38.03
upper	38.35	38.89	39.14	39.18	39.21	38.75
F-ratio						2.84
df						5
Sig.						.015
Pessimism (n)	1346	416	222	619	741	642
Mean	18.64	17.63	18.04	17.82	17.20	16.79
Standard Deviation	3.73	3.51	3.83	3.37	3.21	3.19
95% CI for Mean						
lower	18.44	17.29	17.53	17.55	16.97	16.54
upper	18.84	17.97	18.54	18.08	17.43	17.03
F-ratio						31.55
df						5
Sig.						.000
Individual Anomie (n)	1349	416	222	619	741	642
Mean	16.39	15.85	16.48	15.95	15.43	14.89
Standard Deviation	3.68	3.80	3.80	3.60	3.76	3.40
95% CI for Mean						
lower	16.19	15.48	16.00	15.66	15.16	14.63
upper	16.58	16.21	16.98	16.23	15.70	15.16
F-ratio						17.93
df						5
Sig.						.000

Table 36: Significance Matrices for Occupation by pessimism and Anomie[1]

Pessimism:							
Mean	Occupation	Cadres	Intellectual	Office Staff	Finance Staff	Business Staff	Worker
16.79	Cadres						
17.20	Intellectual						
17.63	Office Staff	★					
17.82	Finance Staff	★	★				
18.04	Business Staff	★	★				
18.64	Worker	★	★	★	★		
Individual Anomie:							
Mean	Occupation	Cadres	Intellectual	Office Staff	Finance Staff	Business Staff	Worker
14.89	Cadres						
15.43	Intellectual						
15.85	Office Staff	★					
15.95	Finance Staff	★					
16.36	Worker	★	★				
16.48	Business Staff	★	★				

★ Indicates significant differences at the .05 level which are shown in the lower triangle of the matrices.

[1] Discontent and distrust are excluded because there are only two significant differences on the discontent measure and only one significant difference on the distrust measure.
Notes:
These matrices are presented to denote significance levels; the method of superscript notation used in other tables is too cumbersome with six categories of the independent variable.

Table 37: Types of work and elements of instability

	Permanent W	Contract W	Seasonal W
Discontent (n)	1694	637	46
Mean	33.59	33.24	33.72
Standard Deviation	5.02	5.14	5.19
95% CI for Mean			
lower	33.35	32.84	32.18
upper	33.83	33.64	35.26
F-ratio			1.09
df			2
Sig.			.335
Distrust (n)	1694	637	46
Mean	38.42	38.19	38.26
Standard Deviation	5.15	5.20	5.49
95% CI for Mean			
lower	38.17	37.78	36.63
upper	38.66	38.59	39.89
F-ratio			.48
df			2
Sig.			.620
Pessimism (n)	1692	636	46
Mean	18.19[a]	17.76[b]	18.72[ab]
Standard Deviation	3.55	3.67	4.26
95% CI for Mean			
lower	18.02	17.48	17.45
upper	18.36	18.05	19.98
F-ratio			4.00
df			2
Sig.			.019
Individual Anomie (n)	1694	637	46
Mean	16.25	16.04	16.41
Standard Deviation	3.70	3.62	4.54
95% CI for Mean			
lower	16.08	15.76	15.07
upper	16.43	16.32	17.76
F-ratio			.824
df			2
Sig.			.439

Table 38: Workplace type and elements of instability

	Profit	No-Profit	Party/Gov.
Discontent (n)	2642	1016	326
Mean	33.72[a]	32.97[b]	32.99[b]
Standard Deviation	5.05	5.04	5.00
95% CI for Mean			
lower	33.53	32.66	32.45
upper	33.91	33.28	33.54
F-ratio			9.68
df			2
Sig.			.000
Distrust (n)	2642	1016	326
Mean	38.33	38.58	38.72
Standard Deviation	5.00	5.21	5.16
95% CI for Mean			
lower	38.14	38.26	38.16
upper	38.52	38.90	39.29
F-ratio			1.57
df			2
Sig.			.209
Pessimism (n)	2639	1016	326
Mean	18.27[a]	16.89[b]	16.98[b]
Standard Deviation	3.63	3.19	3.20
95% CI for Mean			
lower	18.13	16.69	16.23
upper	18.40	17.08	17.32
F-ratio			67.45
df			2
Sig.			.000
(n)	2642	1016	326
Mean	16.13[a]	15.37[b]	15.18[b]
Standard Deviation	3.64	3.76	3.74
95% CI for Mean			
lower	15.99	15.13	14.77
upper	16.26	15.60	15.59
F-ratio			21.59
df			2
Sig.			.000

Elements of Social Instability Across Cities

The research sample of 1996 China survey was drawn from a stratification of 334 cities with a population of approximately 900 million. These cities sprawl over 9,600,000 square kilometers, extending from China's most remote western land to its prosperous and affluent east coast. This section investigates the relationship of city characteristics and elements of social instability. There are 20 cities in our 1996 survey and they differ in

many respects, e.g. the size of the city (in population), the geographical location, the development stage. We suspect due to the uneven social and economic developments among the cities and the resulting different quality of life for their residents, there may be detectable and consistent patterns of social instability that vary across the cities and regions.

City Scores and Elements of Instability (Table 39–Table 45)

Table 39–Table 45 show the relationship between respondents from individual cities and the four subscales. This analysis produces an extremely large matrix (respondents from 20 cities by four subscales). To look for general trends in each subscale, Table 47 will give a summary via rank correlation. Although significance levels are not considered here, we include significance matrices for each subscale (Table 40–Table 45). Our strategy will be to find consistent patterns at the extremes of the four subscales.

The following two cities recorded average respondent scores among the five lowest on at least three of the four subscales: Dalian and Zhengzhou. Respondents from Dalian scored, on average, among the five lowest cities on the discontent scale, the distrust scale, and the pessimism scale. Respondents from Zhengzhou scored, on average, among the five lowest cities on the discontent scale, the pessimism scale, and the anomie scale. The following cities recorded average respondent scores among the five highest on at least three of the four subscales: Yinchuan, Changsha, and Ningbo. Average respondent scores from both Yinchuan and Changsha scored among the five highest cities on all four subscales. Respondents from Ningbo did not score, on average, among the five highest on the pessimism measure. This cursory examination suggests that there is slightly greater continuity across the upper portions of the subscales when respondents are grouped by city of residence. Of course, a more systematic approach to this table may yield different interpretations. Table 47 presents the Spearman rank order correlation between the four subscale across 20 cities. We see high and statistically significant correlation between all subscales except between discontent and individual anomie where the relationship is only moderate and does not reach statistical significance.

Cities by Geographic Location (Table 48)

According to the standard classification, China comprises three regions at highly differentiated development stages: eastern/coastal region; interior region; and western region. The eastern/coastal region is the most developed and most populous area, and the western region is the least developed and least populous. The interior region can be considered between the two other regions in terms of both development and population. The eastern/coastal region and the interior region contain the largest and most modern metropolitan areas and hold over 70% of nation's industry and commerce. The population density in the eastern/coastal region is 2.1 times that of the interior region, and that of the interior region is 6.77 times that of the western region. Territories in the western region and parts of the interior region are inhabited by minority groups. Climate in the remote areas is sometimes disagreeable, cities and country towns are few and far-between as these areas are less populous, poorer and smaller. Transportation and communication with the outside world tends to be backward. During the current economic reform since 1979, regions with affluent industrial and labor resources grasped the opportunities faster than those resource-limited and less open-minded regions, inflating the pre-existing disparities to an unprecedented extent.

Table 48 illustrates the effect of a three category variable of geographic location ("west", "middle" (interior) , and "east") on the four subscales. For each subscale, we find the consistent result that respondents from the "middle" geographic location exhibit less dissatisfaction (i.e., lower discontent, less distrust in government, weaker belief in limited mobility, and less anomie) than respondents from either of the other two geographic regions. Respondents from the "west" and "east" regions show no significant differences between each other , but consistently scored higher (i.e., show greater dissatisfaction) than respondents from the "middle" region. Table 49 shows some characterisitcs of the different geographic regions.

Cities by Average Yearly Income (Table 50)

Yearly average income among the city residents may be a useful indicator of the city's economic status in China's development track. Here we divided this variable into three categories using the mean value of total city income: one third high, one third low, and one thid in the middle. Table 50 indicates that average income within cities is not a good predictor on the anomie subscale as there was no significant differences found among the three city groups (p=.77). We see that respondents from low and middle income cities are most similar in terms of discontent and distrust. Respondents from low and middle income cities show significantly higher levels of discontent and government distrust than respondents from high income cities. In terms of discontent, respondents in middle income cities are not significantly different from respondents in high income cities or respondents in low income cities. We have here a negative association: Respondents from high income cities tend to have lower levels of discontent than people from other cities. Based on Table 50 (and Table 54) the following question comes to mind: What is it about low developed and low income cities which fuels both discontent and distrust in government?

Cities by Average Finance (Table 51)

Like Table 50, we used the sample average to group this variable on city's average finance into three categories: one third above, one third below and one third in the middle. Using city by average finance as the independent variable, Table 51 shows a general trend that respondents from middle and high finance cities are similar in attitudes on all four subscales. Respondents from both middle and high finance cities show significantly more discontent and more distrust than respondents from low finance cities, although the effect on distrust does not reach statistic significance (p=.13). For both the pessimism measure and the anomie measure, the only differences are between respondents from low finance cities and respondents from middle finance cities, though the effect on pessimism does not reach statistic significance. Respondents from high finance cities are not unlike either respondents from low or middle finance cities in terms of pessimism attitudes or anomie.

Cities by Average GNP (Table 52)

For this city average GNP variable, we have three categories: one third percent below, one third above, and one third in the middle. Table 16 indicates that "average GNP of city" is not a useful predictor of respondent subscale scores in pessimism and anomie. Again, there is a trend for the respondents from low and middle GNP cities to have higher levels of discontent and distrust than those from high GNP cities. However, the Bonferroni tests indicate this independent variable did not yield a significant difference between

categories of the four subscales. Setting aside statistical difference for a moment, we did see respondents from "high" GNP cities scored, on average, lowest on three of the four subscales (the exception being results from the individual anomie measure).

Overall we find that using economic indicators such as those used in Tables 13-16 to predict elements of instability does not yield indisputably consistent patterns of unhappiness or disapproval. Meanwhile, there is a trend that respondents from less developed and poor cities have a higher levels of discontent and distrust. However, this trend becomes less discernible with subscales of pessimism and individual anomie. More tests are needed to confirm the results here.

Cities by Population Size (Table 53)

Table 53 shows the relationships between city size and the four subscales. For the discontent measure, respondents from small cities show more discontent than either respondents from medium or large cities. This pattern repeats for the distrust measure, where respondents from small cities indicate more distrust in the government than respondents from either medium or large cities. In terms of our pessimism scores, each category of population size is significantly different from the other categories. Respondents from small cities indicate the greatest pessimism, followed by those from large cities, and then those from medium cities. Analysis of the anomie measure illustrates a similar trend as that on the pessimism measure. Here, respondents from small cities indicate the most anomie, followed (non-significant difference) by those from large cities, and then those from medium cities.

Using city size, the relationships on the discontent and the distrust measures are similar, while the associations found on the pessimism and anomie measures are somewhat alike. This is one of the most apparent trends based on Tables 13-16 (using independent variables arranged by city): the discontent and distrust subscales react very much alike to these independent variables, while the pessimism and anomie subscales behave similarly.

In our comparison of cities by population size we should not overlook the fact that population size is closely related to many economic characteristics of cities, such as level of development and and average GNP.

Cities by Level of Development (Table 54)

Level of city development is a composite measure of social, economic, and political factors. This measure has been trichotomized (low, middle and high), according to the standard classification from the Chinese Statistical Bureau (A Statistical Survey of China, 1996) and is used to predict respondent scores on the four subscales of social instability.

Table 18 below reveals that respondents in low and middle developed cities are different from respondents in high developed cities on both discontent and distrust. In both cases, respondents in low and middle developed cities show higher levels of discontent and distrust in government. In terms of individual anomie, respondents in high developed cities have significantly higher levels of anomie than respondents in low developed cities. Although the difference between respondents from middle and high developed cities is not significant on the anomie measure, respondents from high developed cities show slightly higher levels of anomie. The high levels of anomie indicated by respondents in high developed cities lends support to the argument that anomie results from the scale of life becoming increasingly complex. There were no significant differences found on the

pessimism measure. An individual's assessment of their economic life chances, then, seems not to be related to the level of development of the city within which they reside.

Table 39: City scores on discontent scale

			95% CI of Mean		n	F-ratio	df	Sig
	Mean	Stdv	lower	upper				
						11.46	19	.000
Nanning	31.86	4.60	31.21	32.50	200			
Hangzhou	32.29	4.78	31.62	32.95	200			
Nanjing	32.35	5.27	31.61	33.09	200			
Danian	32.35	4.71	31.69	33.00	200			
Zhengzhou	32.53	5.01	31.83	33.23	200			
Tianjing	32.54	5.13	31.83	33.26	200			
Xingdao	32.64	5.77	31.83	33.44	200			
Guiyang	32.69	5.33	31.95	33.43	201			
Hefei	32.72	4.41	32.10	33.33	200			
Nanchang	32.80	5.06	32.09	33.51	200			
Fuzhou	32.97	4.95	32.28	33.66	200			
Wuhan	33.35	5.51	32.58	34.13	196			
Xining	33.98	5.14	33.26	34.70	200			
Huhhaot	34.35	5.62	33.56	35.13	200			
Chongqing	34.44	4.54	33.81	35.07	200			
Yingquan	34.94	4.52	34.30	35.57	200			
Changsha	35.00	4.35	34.39	35.61	200			
Ningbo	35.01	4.11	34.43	35.58	200			
Shenyang	35.13	5.17	34.41	35.85	200			
Lanzhou	35.50	4.37	34.89	36.10	200			

Table 40: Significance Matrix of City Scores on Discontent Scale

Mean	City	Nanning	Hangzhou	Danian	Nanjing	Zhengzhou	Tianjing	Xingdao	Guiyang	Hefei	Nanchang	Fuzhou	Wuhan	Xining	Huhhaot	Chongqing	Yingquan	Changsha	Ningbo	Shenyang	Lanzhou
31.86	Nanning																				
32.29	Hangzhou																				
32.35	Danian																				
32.35	Nanjing																				
32.53	Zhengzhou																				
32.54	Tianjing																				
32.64	Xingdao																				
32.69	Guiyang																				
32.72	Hefei																				
32.80	Nanchang																				
32.97	Fuzhou																				
33.35	Wuhan																				
33.98	Xining	*																			
34.35	Huhhaot	*	*	*	*	*															
34.44	Chongqing	*	*	*	*	*	*	*													
34.94	Yingquan	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*									
35.00	Changsha	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*									
35.01	Ningbo	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*									
35.13	Shenyang	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*									
35.50	Lanzhou	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*								

Notes :

This matrix is presented to denote significance levels; the method of superscript notation used in other tables is too cumbersome with 20 categories of the independent variable.

(*) indicates significant differences at the .05 level which are shown in the lower triangle of the matrix.

Table 41: City scores on distrust scale

	Mean	Stdv	95% CI of Mean lower	95% CI of Mean upper	n	F-ratio	df	Sig
						8.72	19	.000
Hangzhou	36.63	5.50	35.86	37.39	200			
Danian	37.19	5.23	36.46	37.91	200			
Xingdao	37.32	4.90	36.63	38.00	200			
Guiyang	37.39	4.64	36.74	38.03	200			
Nanchang	37.43	4.35	36.82	38.04	200			
Nanjing	37.62	4.37	37.01	38.23	200			
Fuzhou	37.65	5.20	36.92	38.38	200			
Zhengzhou	37.68	5.16	36.96	38.40	201			
Hefei	38.15	4.60	37.51	38.79	200			
Tianjing	38.26	5.11	37.54	38.97	200			
Shengyang	38.27	5.28	37.53	39.00	200			
Xining	39.01	4.50	38.38	39.63	200			
Nanning	39.01	4.99	38.31	39.71	200			
Huhhaot	39.01	6.48	38.10	39.91	200			
Lanzhou	39.27	4.70	38.61	39.92	200			
Chongqing	39.37	5.33	38.63	40.11	200			
Changsha	39.69	4.32	39.08	40.29	200			
Yingquan	39.75	4.65	39.10	40.39	200			
Ningbo	39.82	5.02	39.12	40.52	200			
Wuhan	40.11	5.11	39.39	40.83	196			

Table 42: Significance Matrix of City Scores on Discontent Scale

Mean	City	Hangzhou	Danian	Xingdao	Guiyang	Nanchang	Nanjing	Fuzhou	Zhengzhou	Hefei	Tianjing	Shenyang	Xining	Huhhaot	Nanning	Lanzhou	Chongqing	Changsha	Yingquan	Ningbo	Wuhan
36.63	Hangzhou																				
37.19	Danian																				
37.32	Xingdao																				
37.39	Guiyang																				
37.43	Nanchang																				
37.62	Nanjing																				
37.65	Fuzhou																				
37.68	Zhengzhou																				
38.15	Hefei																				
38.26	Tianjing																				
38.27	Shenyang																				
39.01	Xining	*																			
39.01	Huhhaot	*																			
39.01	Nanning	*	*																		
39.27	Lanzhou	*	*	*	*	*															
39.37	Chongqing	*	*	*	*	*															
39.69	Changsha	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*												
39.75	Yingquan	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*												
39.82	Ningbo	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*												
40.11	Wuhan	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*									

Notes :

This matrix is presented to denote significance levels; the method of superscript notation used in other tables is too cumbersome with 20 categories of the independent variable.

(*) indicates significant differences at the .05 level which are shown in the lower triangle of the matrix.

Table 43: City scores on pessimism scale

			95% CI of Mean		n	F-ratio	df	Sig
	Mean	Stdv	lower	upper				
						8.33	19	.000
Zhengzhou	16.75	3.20	16.30	17.20	200			
Nanning	16.76	3.19	16.31	17.20	200			
Guiyang	16.93	3.68	16.41	17.44	201			
Xingdao	17.10	3.50	16.61	17.58	200			
Danian	17.30	3.40	16.83	17.77	200			
Fuzhou	17.42	3.29	16.96	17.87	200			
Hefei	17.43	2.91	17.02	17.84	200			
Nanjing	17.49	3.83	16.95	18.03	198			
Hangzhou	17.55	2.83	17.15	17.94	200			
Nanchang	17.57	3.01	17.15	17.98	200			
Wuhan	17.65	3.86	17.10	18.19	200			
Chongqing	17.81	3.39	17.33	18.28	200			
Lanzhou	18.22	3.35	17.75	18.68	200			
Ningbo	18.25	3.34	17.78	18.71	200			
Tianjing	18.27	3.51	17.78	18.76	200			
Yingquan	18.52	3.88	17.98	19.04	199			
Changsha	18.59	3.07	18.16	19.02	200			
Xining	18.59	3.96	18.03	19.14	200			
Huhhaot	18.72	4.10	18.15	19.29	200			
Shengyang	19.28	4.02	18.71	19.84	200			

Table 44: Significance Matrix of City Scores on Discontent Scale

Mean	City	Zhengzhou	Nanning	Guiyang	Xingdao	Danian	Fuzhou	Hefei	Nanjing	Hangzhou	Nanchang	Wuhan	Chongqing	Lanzhou	Ningbo	Tianjing	Yingquan	Xining	Changsha	Huhhaot	Shenyang
16.75	Zhengzhou																				
16.76	Nanning																				
16.93	Guiyang																				
17.10	Xingdao																				
17.30	Danian																				
17.42	Fuzhou																				
17.43	Hefei																				
17.49	Nanjing																				
17.55	Hangzhou																				
17.57	Nanchang																				
17.65	Wuhan																				
17.81	Chongqing																				
18.22	Lanzhou	*	*	*																	
18.25	Ningbo	*	*	*																	
18.27	Tianjing	*	*	*																	
18.52	Yingquan	*	*	*	*																
18.59	Xining	*	*	*	*	*															
18.59	Changsha	*	*	*	*	*															
18.72	Huhhaot	*	*	*	*	*	*	*													
19.28	Shenyang	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*								

Notes :

This matrix is presented to denote significance levels; the method of superscript notation used in other tables is too cumbersome with 20 categories of the independent variable.

(*) indicates significant differences at the .05 level which are shown in the lower triangle of the matrix.

Table 45: City scores on individual anomie scale

	Mean	Stdv	95% CI of Mean lower	95% CI of Mean upper	n	F-ratio	df	Sig
						4.78	19	.000
Hefei	14.93	3.23	14.48	15.38	200			
Zhengzhou	15.25	3.76	14.73	15.77	200			
Nanchang	15.29	3.53	14.79	15.78	200			
Fuzhou	15.37	3.26	14.92	15.82	200			
Guiyang	15.47	3.77	14.95	16.00	201			
Xingdao	15.49	3.75	14.97	16.01	200			
Danian	15.51	3.78	15.02	15.99	200			
Lanzhou	15.51	4.15	14.93	16.09	200			
Nanning	15.53	3.56	15.03	16.02	200			
Nanjing	15.61	3.72	15.09	16.13	200			
Shengyang	15.84	3.79	15.31	16.36	200			
Chongqing	15.97	3.86	15.43	16.50	200			
Xining	16.00	3.98	15.45	16.55	200			
Hangzhou	16.17	3.25	15.72	16.36	200			
Wuhan	16.24	3.71	15.72	16.77	196			
Changsha	16.26	3.50	15.77	16.74	200			
Yingquan	16.33	3.53	15.84	16.82	200			
Huhhaot	16.34	3.93	15.79	16.89	200			
Ningbo	16.79	3.48	16.30	17.27	200			
Tianjing	17.22	3.94	16.67	17.77	200			

Table 12-D1. Significance Matrix of City Scores on Individual Anomie Scale

Mean	City	Hefei	Zhengzhou	Nanchang	Fuzhou	Guiyang	Xingdao	Danian	Lanzhou	Nanning	Nanjing	Shenyang	Chongqing	Xining	Hangzhou	Wuhan	Changsha	Yingquan	Huhhaot	Ningbo	Tianjing
14.93	Hefei																				
15.25	Zhengzhou																				
15.29	Nanchang																				
15.37	Fuzhou																				
15.47	Guiyang																				
15.49	Xingdao																				
15.51	Danian																				
15.51	Lanzhou																				
15.53	Nanning																				
15.61	Nanjing																				
15.84	Shenyang																				
15.97	Chongqing																				
16.00	Xining																				
16.17	Hangzhou																				
16.24	Wuhan																				
16.26	Changsha																				
16.33	Yingquan	*																			
16.34	Huhhaot	*																			
16.79	Ningbo	*	*	*	*																
17.22	Tianjing	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*									

Notes :

This matrix is presented to denote significance levels; the method of superscript notation used in other tables is too cumbersome with 20 categories of the independent variable.

(*) indicates significant differences at the .05 level which are shown in the lower triangle of the matrix.

Table 46: Ranking of the city scores on all four subscales

	Discontent	Distrust	Passimism	Ind. Anomie
Nanning	1	13	2	9
Hangzhou	2	1	9	14
Nanjing	3	6	8	10
Danian	4	2	5	7
Zhengzhou	5	8	1	2
Tianjing	6	10	15	20
Xingdao	7	3	4	6
Guiyang	8	4	3	5
Hefei	9	9	7	1
Nanchang	10	5	10	3
Fuzhou	11	7	6	4
Wuhan	12	20	11	15
Xining	13	12	18	13
Huhhaot	14	14	19	18
Chongqing	15	16	12	12
Yingquan	16	18	16	17
Changsha	17	16	17	16
Ningbo	18	19	14	19
Shenyang	19	11	20	11
Lanzhou	20	15	13	8

Table 47: Spearman correlation coefficients Matrix

N=20

	Anomie	Discontent	Distrust
Discontnet	.3323 sig .152		
Distrust	.5777 sig .008	.6860 sig .001	
Pessimism	.7143 sig .000	.7278 sig .010	.5634 sig .010

Table 48: City scores by geographic location

	West	Middle	East
Discontent (n)	1401	1200	1396
Mean	34.04[a]	32.55[b]	33.69[a]
Stdv	5.01	4.97	5.08
95% CI for Mean			
lower	33.78	32.27	33.42
upper	34.30	32.83	33.95
F-ratio			30.42
df			2
Sig.			.000
Distrust (n)	1401	1200	1396
Mean	39.01[a]	37.40[b]	38.72[a]
Stdv	4.99	4.98	5.15
95% CI for Mean			
lower	38.75	37.11	38.45
upper	39.27	37.68	38.99
F-ratio			36.91
df			2
Sig.			.000
Pessimism (n)	1400	1200	1394
Mean	18.04[a]	17.28[b]	18.02[a]
Stdv	3.70	3.15	3.66
95% CI for Mean			
lower	17.85	17.10	17.83
upper	18.24	17.46	18.22
F-ratio			19.10
df			2
Sig.			.000
Individual Anomie (n)	1401	1200	1396
Mean	15.92[a]	15.44[b]	16.15[a]
Stdv	3.79	3.52	3.73
95% CI for Mean			
lower	15.72	15.24	15.95
upper	16.12	15.64	16.34
F-ratio			12.23
df			2
Sig.			.000

Table 49: Population and industry distribution of different areas in china

	Eastern Region	**Interior Region**	**Western Region**
% of National Territory	14.2	34.3	51.5
% of Total Population	41.9	35.6	22.5
Population Density (Capital/Square Kilometer)	310	149	22
% of Total Value in Industry and Agriculture	52.3	37.4	10.3
% of Total Value of Industry Production	54.8	33.5	11.7
% of Total Number of Employees	45.6	38.2	16.2
% of Total National Transportation Turnover	53.4	34.0	12.6

Source: A Statistical Survey of China, 1996, Beijing.

Table 50: City scores by average yearly income

unit: yuan	**3947-4566**	**4731-5431**	**6054-6735**
Discontent (n)	1201	1796	1000
Mean	34.06[a]	33.38[ab]	32.92[b]
Stdv	5.14	4.97	5.06
95% CI for Mean			
lower	33.76	33.15	32.61
upper	34.35	33.61	33.24
F-ratio			14.22
df			2
Sig.			.000
Distrust (n)	1201	1796	1000
Mean	38.53[a]	38.75a	37.71[b]
Stdv	5.24	4.92	5.13
95% CI for Mean			
lower	38.24	38.53	37.39
upper	38.83	38.98	38.03
F-ratio			13.90
df			2
Sig.			.000
Pessimism (n)	1200	1796	998
Mean	18.13	17.74	17.54
Stdv	3.77	3.44	3.41
95% CI for Mean			
lower	17.92	17.58	17.32
upper	18.35	17.90	17.75
F-ratio			8.40
df			2
Sig.			.000
Individual Anomie (n)	1201	1796	1000
Mean	15.87	15.81	15.91
Stdv	3.75	3.74	3.57
95% CI for Mean			
lower	15.66	15.64	15.69
upper	16.08	15.98	16.13
F-ratio			.258
df			2
Sig.			.772

Table 51: City scores by average finance

unit: yuan	**297-542**	**595-856**	**864-1293**
Discontent (n)	1201	1596	1200
Mean	33.27[a]	33.37[b]	33.80[b]
Stdv	4.99	5.07	5.09
95% CI for Mean			
lower	32.99	33.12	33.51
upper	33.56	33.62	34.09
F-ratio			3.76
df			2
Sig.			.023
Distrust (n)	1201	1596	1200
Mean	38.23	38.61	38.37
Stdv	4.73	5.12	5.38
95% CI for Mean			
lower	37.96	38.36	38.07
upper	38.50	38.86	38.68
F-ratio			2.02
df			2
Sig.			.133
Pessimism (n)	1200	1594	1200
Mean	17.63	17.92	17.83
Stdv	3.53	3.55	3.55
95% CI for Mean			
lower	17.43	17.75	17.63
upper	17.83	18.10	18.03
F-ratio			2.42
df			2
Sig.			.090
Individual Anomie (n)	1201	1596	1200
Mean	15.54[a]	16.10[b]	15.83[ab]
Stdv	3.66	3.70	3.72
95% CI for Mean			
lower	15.34	15.92	15.62
upper	15.75	16.00	16.04
F-ratio			7.85
df			2
Sig.			.000

Table 52: City scores by average GNP

unit: yuan	**4406-8444**	**8563-11927**	**14154-20037**
Discontent (n)	1401	1596	1000
Mean	33.81	33.47	32.99
Stdv	5.05	5.16	4.88
95% CI for Mean			
lower	33.55	33.22	32.69
upper	34.08	33.72	33.29
F-ratio			7.70
df			2
Sig.			.001
Distrust (n)	1401	1596	1000
Mean	38.60	38.67	37.78
Stdv	5.06	5.02	5.18
95% CI for Mean			
lower	38.34	38.43	37.46
upper	38.87	38.92	38.10
F-ratio			10.91
df			2
Sig.			.000
Pessimism (n)	1400	1596	998
Mean	17.88	17.88	17.60
Stdv	3.68	3.53	3.36
95% CI for Mean			
lower	17.68	17.70	17.39
upper	18.07	18.05	17.81
F-ratio			2.29
df			2
Sig.			.101
Individual Anomie (n)	1401	1596	1000
Mean	15.69	15.98	15.89
Stdv	3.80	3.74	3.48
95% CI for Mean			
lower	15.49	15.79	15.67
upper	15.89	16.16	16.10
F-ratio			2.30
df			2
Sig.			.101

Table 53: City scores by population size

	Under 1 Mil	1–2 Mil	Over 2 Mil
Discontent (n)	600	2001	1396
Mean	34.42[a]	33.33[b]	33.26[b]
Stdv	5.12	4.86	5.26
95% CI for Mean			
lower	34.01	33.12	32.98
upper	34.83	33.55	33.53
F-ratio			12.62
df			2
Sig.			.000
Distrust (n)	600	2001	1396
Mean	39.25[a]	38.27[b]	38.30[b]
Stdv	5.29	4.96	5.14
95% CI for Mean			
lower	38.83	38.05	38.03
upper	39.68	38.49	38.57
F-ratio			9.33
df			2
Sig.			.000
Pessimism (n)	599	2001	1394
Mean	18.61[a]	17.54[b]	17.84[c]
Stdv	3.97	3.25	3.70
95% CI for Mean			
lower	18.29	17.40	17.65
upper	18.93	17.69	18.04
F-ratio			21.17
df			2
Sig.			.000
Individual Anomie (n)	600	2001	1396
Mean	16.22[a]	15.66[b]	15.98[a]
Stdv	3.81	3.59	3.79
95% CI for Mean			
lower	15.92	15.49	15.78
upper	16.53	15.81	16.18
F-ratio			6.72
df			2
Sig.			.001

Table 54: City level of development and elements of instability

	Low	Middle	High
Discontent (n)	1601	1196	1200
Mean	33.60[a]	33.85[a]	32.92[b]
Stdv	5.03	5.18	4.92
95% CI for Mean			
lower	33.35	33.56	32.64
upper	33.85	34.14	33.20
F-ratio			11.14
df			2
Sig.			.000
Distrust (n)	1601	1196	1200
Mean	38.62[a]	38.73[a]	37.86[b]
Stdv	4.96	5.12	5.17
95% CI for Mean			
lower	38.38	38.44	37.57
upper	38.87	39.02	38.15
F-ratio			10.89
df			2
Sig.			.000
Pessimism (n)	1600	1196	1198
Mean	17.84	17.86	17.71
Stdv	3.60	3.62	3.39
95% CI for Mean			
lower	17.66	17.66	17.52
upper	18.02	18.07	17.90
F-ratio			.642
df			2
Sig.			.527
Individual Anomie (n)	1601	1196	1200
Mean	15.67[a]	15.84[ab]	16.11[b]
Stdv	3.74	3.74	3.59
95% CI for Mean			
lower	15.49	15.63	15.91
upper	15.86	16.05	16.31
F-ratio			4.79
df			2
Sig.			.008

Elements of Instability Across Socioeconomic (SES) Groups

In this section, we created three indices as measurement of individuals' socioeconomic status: absolute deprivation (AD), relative deprivation (RD), and status inconsistency (SI). We then used these three indices as independent variables and the four subscales as dependent variables in our examination of elements of social instability across socioeconomic groups. In the sections below, we first explained briefly how we

constructed each of the three socioeconomic indices, then presented the findings, and finally commented on the findings.

Absolute Deprivation (AD) Score and Elements of Instability (Table 55)

In 1996 survey, our measure of absolute deprivation covers a wide range of dimensions. We started with universally-adopted social class indicators, such as occupational prestige, educational attainment, and individual's monthly income. We also included those measurements particular to current Chinese society, namely political party affiliation, workplace status, and inter-regional differences. Using cluster analysis and factor loading statistics, we were able to narrow myriad aspects of social inequality into the following dimensions: education, income, occupational ranking, workplace status, and respondent's residence city.

The AD scale was constructed by calculating the Z-score from each of the five dimensions and adding them together. The final AD index ranges from -8.477 to 9.462. The kurtosis is -.369 and skewness is .216, indicating a normal curve. We created three AD categories by drawing a one standard deviation band around the mean of the AD scale (½ standard deviation below the mean and ½ standard deviation above the mean). Scores below this band were grouped as the "low AD" category, scores above this band were grouped as the "high AD" category, and scores located within this one standard deviation band around the mean were grouped together as the "median AD" category. Absolute deprivation scores can be interpreted in the following way: Lower AD scores indicate lower SES and higher AD scores indicate higher SES. In another words, the lower AD groups were the people in economic, social, and political disadvantages during the year of 1996.

The effects of absolute deprivation on the subscales are fairly linear but vary across subscales in terms of the directions of the relationships. On the discontent, pessimism, and anomie measures, high levels of absolute deprivation are associated with greater discontent (although the difference between medium and low AD does not reach significance at the .05 level for discontent), stronger sense of pessimism, and stronger sense of anomie. The exception here is the effect of absolute deprivation on level of distrust of government. In this case, the high absolute deprivation group averaged the lowest distrust in government score (compared to the low and medium absolute deprivation groups). The negative association between respondents' AD score and the distrust measure tells us people lower in SES still trusted the government despite of their other disapproval feelings during the reform.

Status Inconsistency (SI) and Elements of Instability (Table 56)

Individuals may rank inconsistently along the different dimensions of social inequality. For instance, a given individual may hold a high prestige job and be highly educated but fall into the low income group. Status inconsistency (SI) occurs when different components of an individual's social status are not at a compatible level. During the current economic transition with the old ranking criteria and the new ranking criteria coexisting, we expect that people tend to feel greater status inconsistency. However, our SI index is more an objective measure than an indicator of subjective feelings.

In our survey of urban China, we included several questions pertaining to social inequality: income, education, workplace status, and occupational prestige. We regressed each of the four inequality components as an independent variable to predict the other

aspects of inequality. We saved each studentized residual as a basic individual score so we could determine the difference between the observed value and the predicted value. We summed these scores to construct our scale of status inconsistency. The final SI index has a range of 23.18, with a minimum of -12.12 and a maximum of 11.057. The skewness is .016 and kurtosis is -.70, indicating a normal distribution of scores. Again we split respondents' SI scores into three categories of low, middle, and high for our ANOVA table. The scores on the SI index can be interpreted as follows: high scores indicate a high level of status inconsistency while low scores indicate a low level of status inconsistency.

The results presented in Table 21 show significant differences on three of the four subscales, with distrust in government being the exception. On each of the other three subscales, we find that increased status inconsistency is associated with greater discontent, stronger sense of pessimism, and higher level of individual anomie. These results are linear across groups of the independent variable, and all differences are significant at the .05 level. The slight negative association between respondents' SI scores and distrust scores echoed that found between AD and distrust scores. The result indicates that like people in lower SES status, people with imbalanced rewards during our 1996 survey still trusted the government's ability to solve their problems although they felt strong sense of discontent, pessimism, and anomie.

Relative Deprivation (RD) Score and Elements of Instability (Table 57)

We argue that the subjective ranking of one's place in society is an important part of the stratification system. To capture this subjective aspects, we created an index of relative deprivation (RD). The RD index is constructed from survey items which estimate respondent "rewards" in comparison to that of others.

In our 1996 questionnaire, respondents were presented with two set of questions concerning their standings in terms of their economic return and social return in relation to that of others. The first set of questions asked the respondents to focus on a comparison with their equals in their workplace, and the second set of questions asked respondents to focus their comparison on the people in society at large. Respondents were given five response options to make their comparison: much higher (coded as 1); a little bit higher (coded as 2); more or less the same (coded as 3); a little bit lower (coded as 4); and much lower (coded as 5). The total score was calculated by adding each of the five comparisons and dividing by the total number of questions. The final RD index ranges from a minimum of 1.8 to a maximum of 5.0, with a kurtosis of .206 and a skewness of .400. As with the absolute deprivation measure, we created three RD categories by drawing a one standard deviation band around the mean of the RD index (½ standard deviation below the mean and ½ standard deviation above the mean). Scores below this band were grouped as the "low RD" category, scores above this band were grouped as the "high RD" category, and scores located within this one standard deviation band around the mean were grouped together as the "median RD" category. The RD score can be interpreted as higher scores indicate higher levels of relative deprivation and lower scores, lower levels of relative deprivation.

Table 57 shows that the measure of relative deprivation has a positive association with each of the four subscales. That is, high relative deprivation is associated with high discontent, high distrust, greater sense of pessimism, and greater sense of individual anomie. All differences are significant at the .05 level, with the exception of those on the individual anomie measure for the low and medium deprivation groups. While the

difference between low and medium relative deprivation groups is not significant, the trend still apparent with respondents indicating medium relative deprivation exhibiting slightly more anomie than respondents scoring low relative deprivation. It is also interesting to note that the mean difference between high and medium groups (average mean difference of 1.8 points across all four subscales) is consistently greater than the mean difference between medium and low groups (average mean difference of 1.3 points across all four subscales). The above findings reveals a general trend that respondents who had compared themselves inferior to the people around tended to develop high levels of discontent, distrust, pessimism, and anomie.

As a summary we may conclude the following. The findings in this section (D) reveal that the three measures of people's socioeconomic status are good predictors of their disapproving attitudes tapped by our instrument. The general patterns are: the higher the SES measures, the higher are the levels of disapproving attitudes, with an exception of the measure of distrust in government. The exception found here seems to imply that people in disadvantaged social and economic groups and people who received imbalanced rewards seem to retain to their beliefs in government.

Table 55: Absolute deprivation (AD) score and elements of instability

	Low (AD)	Medium (AD)	High (AD)
Discontent (n)	1206	1316	1290
Mean	32.89[a]	33.30[a]	34.22[b]
Stdv	4.96	5.09	5.00
95% CI for Mean			
lower	32.61	33.03	33.95
upper	33.17	33.58	34.49
F-ratio			23.12
df			2
Sig.			.000
Distrust (n)	1206	1316	1290
Mean	38.67[a]	38.61[a]	38.03[b]
Stdv	5.02	4.97	5.18
95% CI for Mean			
lower	38.39	38.34	37.75
upper	38.96	38.87	38.31
F-ratio			6.26
df			2
Sig.			.002
Pessimism (n)	1206	1316	1288
Mean	16.67[a]	17.65[b]	19.03[c]
Stdv	3.00	3.44	3.72
95% CI for Mean			
lower	16.50	17.46	18.83
upper	16.84	17.84	19.23
F-ratio			151.54
df			2
Sig.			.000
Individual Anomie (n)	1206	1316	1290
Mean	15.13[a]	15.83[b]	16.52[c]
Stdv	3.57	3.60	3.80
95% CI for Mean			
lower	14.93	15.63	16.31
upper	15.33	16.03	16.73
F-ratio			45.06
df			2
Sig.			.000

Table 56: Status inconsistency (SI) and elements of instability

	Low (SI)	Medium (SI)	High (SI)
Discontent (n)	1284	1260	1272
Mean	32.45[a]	33.59[b]	34.43[c]
Stdv	4.86	4.99	5.10
95% CI for Mean			
lower	32.19	33.31	34.15
upper	32.72	33.86	34.71
F-ratio			50.57
df			2
Sig.			.000
Distrust (n)	1284	1260	1272
Mean	38.37	38.56	38.35
Stdv	4.87	5.14	5.17
95% CI for Mean			
lower	38.10	38.28	38.07
upper	38.63	38.65	38.64
F-ratio			.6769
df			2
Sig.			.508
Pessimism (n)	1284	1259	1271
Mean	16.64[a]	17.72[b]	19.08[c]
Stdv	2.94	3.40	3.79
95% CI for Mean			
lower	16.47	17.53	18.87
upper	16.80	17.91	19.29
F-ratio			166.34
df			2
Sig.			.000
Individual Anomie (n)	1284	1260	1272
Mean	15.23[a]	15.85[b]	16.46[c]
Stdv	3.45	3.72	3.83
95% CI for Mean			
lower	15.04	15.64	16.24
upper	15.42	16.05	16.67
F-ratio			35.70
df			2
Sig.			.000

Table 57: Relative deprivation (RD) score and elements of instability

	Low (RD)	Medium (RD)	High (RD)
Discontent (n)	1283	1658	1052
Mean	30.84[a]	33.62[b]	36.44[c]
Stdv	4.77	4.42	4.63
95% CI for Mean			
lower	30.58	33.40	36.16
upper	31.11	33.83	36.72
F-ratio			430.52
df			2
Sig.			.000
Distrust (n)	1283	1658	1052
Mean	37.66[a]	38.36[b]	39.46[c]
Stdv	5.09	4.81	5.33
95% CI for Mean			
lower	37.38	38.13	39.14
upper	37.94	38.59	39.79
F-ratio			37.34
df			2
Sig.			.000
Pessimism (n)	1283	1655	1052
Mean	16.01[a]	17.72[b]	20.13[c]
Stdv	2.79	3.02	3.81
95% CI for Mean			
lower	15.86	17.57	19.90
upper	16.16	17.86	20.36
F-ratio			485.78
df			2
Sig.			.000
Individual Anomie (n)	1283	1658	1052
Mean	15.49[a]	15.68[a]	16.56[b]
Stdv	3.45	3.61	4.04
95% CI for Mean			
lower	15.30	15.51	16.32
upper	15.68	15.85	16.81
F-ratio			27.50
df			2
Sig.			.000

Dimensions of Social Inequality in Urban China

As previously mentioned, the SES indicators we have created in this section represent both the objective and subjective aspects of social inequality in 1996 urban China. Table 23 below presents the correlation matrix of the three SES indicators: Absolute Deprivation (AD), Status Inconsistency (SI), and Relative Deprivation (RD).

Table 58: Correlation Matrix of AD, SI, and RD

	AD	SI	RD
AD	1.00		
SI	.63	1.00	
RD	.29	.36	1.00

Based on Table 58, we find that two objective indicators: AD and SI, have a close positive relationship, suggesting the higher is one's score on absolute deprivation, the higher is his or her score on status inconsistency. Meanwhile the coefficients between the two objective SES indicators and the subjective indicator, RD are also have positive but are of smaller magnitude. The finding suggests that respondents of our 1996 survey used their objective SES status as a base in their comparison with others in estimating their social/political and economic status.

3 Exploring elements of social instability

There are two sections in Part III. Section 1 explores inter-subscale associations and suggests that the four subscales in the instrument may be used either separately or as a cohesive measurement set. The suggestion is in line with our previous discussion on scale construction: the four domains in our scale – discontent, distrust, pessimism, and individual anomie, although conceptually distinct from each other, are empirically related to each other.

Section 2 presents a hypothesized model and tests its power with the current data set. The model is an attempt to draw some sequential links from people's socio-economic status using our RD, AD, and SI indicators, to the elements of social instability as measured by the instrument, and finally to the social system as a whole. We propose that our SES measurements are positively related to elements of social instability which, in turn, are positive related to the system reaction.

3.1 Exploring the Four Social Warning Signals

In this section, we explore the relationship of the four subscales in our social warning instrument. In Table 59 below, we present the correlation matrix of the four subscales. And we follow it with a short paragraph of interpretation and a short paragraph of discussion.

Table 59: Pearson's Correlation Coefficients for the Four Subscales

	Discontent	Distrust	Pessimism
Distrust	.48 (3997) p = .000		
Pessimism	.517 (3994) p =.000	.329 (3994) p = .000	
Individual Anomie	.249 (3997) p = .000	.301 (3997) p = .000	.354 (3994) p = . 000

Based on Table 59, we find that all four measures of the instrument: discontent, distrust, pessimism, and individual anomie, are positively related. All the associations reach statistical significance at the level of .000. The results indicate that our respondents tend to adopt disapproving or approving attitudes on all four subscales simultaneously. Especially the close relationships between discontent and distrust and between discontent and pessimism deserve our attention.

On a broader perspective, the findings confirm our repeated proposition that the four domains in our social warning instrument are conceptually distinguishable but are empirically related to each other. They suggest that the four subscales are scored properly to tap a similar underlying construct of what we consider as elements of social instability. Due to their strong empirically association, the subscales may be used separately to gauge public opinions of a certain aspect or aspects of social life or may be

combined into a larger measure of (dis)satisfaction as a cohesive measurement continuum. The findings also point to the necessity of a further investigation of the subscale relationships and their relationship with prior and consequential variables.

3.2 Social Instability in a Block-Ordered System

To further explore elements of social instability, we have employed what some methodologists called system of "partial orders" or "ordered blocks" (Davis: 1985). This sequential system of cause-and-effect attempts to establish links among sets of interrelated variables.

Basically, two steps were involved here for us to set up the system. First we identified the potential variables and blocks of our research interest. Three blocks with eight variables were thus established in our system. They are SES Block, Instability Block, and System Block. SES Block has three variables: Absolute deprivation (AD), status inconsistency (SI), and Relative Deprivation (RD). Instability Block has four variables: discontent, distrust, pessimism, and individual anomie. System Block has one variable: system reaction (not measured in this research). Variables in each of the three blocks act as an interactive entity and their relationships with others in their block were discussed in previous sections on the Dimensions of Social Inequality in Urban China and on the Interscale Association among the Four Subscales.

Next, we proceeded to draw causal linkages between the SES block (Block I), the social instability block (Block II), and the system reaction block (Block III). The sequence from Block I (x1) to Block II (x2) reflects our proposition that elements of social instability are associated with people's socio-economic positions in a social system. The sequence from Block II (x2) to Block III (x3) reflects our proposition that the system, in order to continue and thrive, has to react to any of the four types of social instability: large-scale social discontent, large-scale distrust in government competence, deep pessimistic and anomic feelings among the broad mass. The chains in our block ordered system represent our repeated assertion throughout this report that elements of social instability as a social property result from the transformation of the system and thus should be alleviated by system adjustment.



Fig. 1: Elements of Instability as a Block Ordered System

Fig. 1 illustrates our points on the flow of system blocks in a diagram. Fig. 2 below of *A Hypothesized Order System of Elements of Social Instability* specifies our hypothesized

model with interactive variables in each block and sequential orders among the three blocks. And Table 60 below of *Sequential Coefficients for the 3-block Ordered System* presents the actual coefficients in the system. Each of the above-mentioned three presentations is followed by paragraphs of interpretation and discussion.

As indicated in Fig. 1, there are three blocks in our system of “partial orders” and each prior block is hypothesized to have causal effect on its succeeding block as a cohesive complex. This is indicated by the one-way arrow heads from SES Block (x1) through Instability Block (x2) and finally to System Reaction Block (x3) (not measured in this study).

At stage one, people have different locations in the system as measured by AD, SI, and RD. Their social locations affect their opinions and attitudes about the system as measured by the subscales of discontent, distrust, pessimism, and individual anomie at stage two. These disapproving sentiments among the populace constitute elements of social instability, to which the system has no choice but to react in some way at stage three. The positive sign from Block I to Block II suggests that high levels of SES scores predict high levels of social instability. Here be aware: respondents with high AD scores were in political/economic/social disadvantages in China’s reform of 1996. Respondents with high SI scores had an imbalanced ranking of their social and economic status. Respondents with high scores on RD considered themselves inferior to people around them in terms of their benefits from the reforms. Here high SES scores in our research represent high disadvantage. The positive sign from Block II to Block III in Fig. 1 suggests that all the elements in Social Instability block would activate the system for appropriate action. Next in Fig. 2 we specify a series of hypothetical sequences among the three blocks and eight variables in the block ordered system.



Fig. 2: A Hypothesized Order System of Elements of Social Instability

For purpose of clarity, we differentiated the lines of our arrows in our graphic presentation in Fig. 2. The two-headed arrow with curved lines at the left of our model represent correlation among the three SES variables. Arrows with dashed lines represent causal flows from variables in the SES Block to variables in the Instability Block. Arrows with two heads and solid lines represent a parallel relationship between the discontent and distrust constructs. The two-headed arrow head linking discontent and distrust indicates correlation rather than causation of the two constructs. Arrows with one head and solid lines imply possible linkages from variables of discontent and distrust to variables of pessimism and anomie. By placing the constructs of discontent and distrust prior to constructs of pessimism and individual anomie in our system, we are proposing the latter two constructs may be conceived as consequences of the former two constructs: people with high disapproving feelings of discontent and distrust during the transition have the tendency to take on anomic and pessimist attitudes towards life. And again the solid line with two heads linking pessimism and individual anomie represents a parallel relationship between the two constructs. The one-way arrows with heavy solid lines represent the causal effects from variables in the instability block to the system reaction block. All four types of social instability in our system diagram are hypothesized to require system reaction.

There might well be many more other potential linkages than what we have indicated in our system diagram in Fig. 2 We have limited our selection to those that appeal to our research interest or we think deserve our attention. Though relationships hypothesized among the variables and blocks in the system passed our logic checks, they may not

reach statistical significance in our empirical runs of our present data as reported in Table 60 of the actual sequential coefficients in the system. In Table 60 below, column one (X) lists our exogenous variables and Column two (Y) lists our endogenous variables. Column three reports the coefficients of the sequential linkages and their significance level in parentheses. We used " – " in this column to indicate that the sequential relationship remains hypothetical because of non-measurement. Column four gives the interpretation of the coefficients found between the Xs and Ys.

Table 60: Sequential Coefficients for Three-Block Order System

X	Y	Coefficients (Sig.)	Interpretation
x1a	x2a	-.1013 (.000)	Higher AD measure predicts lower discontent
x1a	x2b	.0550 (.001)	——
x1b	x2a	-.1503 (.000)	Higher SI measure predicts lower discontent
x1b	x2b	.0148 (.360)	——
x1c	x2a	-.4585 (.000)	Higher RD measure predicts lower discontent
x1c	x2b	-.1625 (.000)	Higher RD measure predicts lower distrust
x2a	x2c	.5174 (.000)	Higher discontent scores predict higher pessimism
x2a	x2d	.2491 (.000)	Higher discontent scores predict higher Ind. anomie
x2b	x2c	.3294 (.000)	Higher distrust scores predict higher pessimism
x2b	x2d	.3013 (.000)	Higher distrust scores predict higher Ind. Anomie
x2a	x3	—	Higher mass discontent requires system reaction
x2b	x3	—	Higher mass distrust requires system reaction
x2c	x3	—	Higher mass pessimism requires system reaction
x2d	x3	—	Higher mass anomie requires system reaction

On reading Fig. 2 and Table 60, be aware that the diagram represents our *hypothesized* links. While those links passed our logic concepts of a time order, they may not be found valid in our present data set. Table 60 reports the actual coefficients of the sequences in our three-block ordered system. The coefficients are the *b*s from OLS and the cutting point for the significance level is set at .05. Thus those coefficients below .05 are considered not conclusive enough to establish the sequence.

Table 60 reveals that all three measures in SES block have some predictive power for respondents' level of discontent and distrust. On the levels of discontent, the effect from respondents's RD has the largest positive value (.41), indicating the higher is the former, the higher is the latter. Meanwhile, the effect from respondents' AD has a small negative value of -.035, suggesting the higher is the former, the lower is the latter. The negative effect from respondents' AD to their levels of discontent, however, does not reach statistical significance. On the level of distrust in government's capability, again respondents' AD score has a negative effect while their SI and RE scores have a potive effects. Here a pattern seems to be that people with higher AD scores have lower distrust in the government and people with higher SI and RD scores have higher distrust in the government. In general, the findings about the negative association between respondent's AD scores and levels of discontent and distrust lead us to see some merits in the statement that absolute deprivation among the population does not produce disapproving sentiments but feelings of relative deprivation and an inadequate and imbalance stratification system do.

From the Instability Block to the System Block in Fig. 2, all the four elements of social instability activate system reactions. Since there is no measurement in system reaction block, the sequences from the social instability to the system reaction remain hypothetical as indicated by " – " in column three under the heading of Coefficients (sig.) in Table 60.

Finally we have included an alternative model of Elements of Social Instability. Like the model in Fig. 2, the alternative model in Fig. 3 specifies the causal sequences from the SES Block, via the Social Instability Block, and finally to the System Block. The small coefficient above each variable is from $1–R^2$ of the regression models with that variable entered as the dependent variable and all the prior variables entered as independent variables.



Fig. 3: An Alternative Ordered System of Element of Social Instability

4 Closing Remarks: A Summary of Findings

1.0. **Anomie and Social Instability.** In this research we have repeatedly emphasized that anomie is, above all, a social property reflected by individuals' attitudes, opinions, and perceptions. Like many other social phenomena, anomie experienced by individuals or aggregates of individuals has both constructive and destructive functions. This research explores the interaction between anomie and the social system and treats anomie as a form of social instability.

1.1. We argue that great and dramatic changes within a system are often accompanied by structural strains which would leave imprints on the sentiments and morale of its populace, thus spawning elements of social instability. China in the year of 1996 was in such a period of system transition where the traditional socialist politics/control coexisted and contended with capitalist free markets.

1.2. Thanks to the dramatic changes that occurred in this unique transitional period, China in 1996 presented an excellent social laboratory for us to observe social instability in the making. A survey instrument was thus designed and administrated to the 4000 urban residents from 20 cities of varying sizes and geographic locations. This national survey, however, served a two-fold purpose: (1) to develop a measurement scale of social instability and (2) to test the instrument among the surveying population.

1.3. *The Instrument parameters*. Prior to the construction of the measurement scale, we set up following parameters: such an instrument should be able to send out early warning signals about the overall anomic conditions of the system in transition; it should consist of multidimensional measures tapping different aspects of subjectively experienced social events; and it should be simple, easy to use, sensitive, and with some degree of generalizability.

2.0. **The Social Warning Instrument**. The final instrument consists of four subscales, eight core elements, and thirty-two items. The four subcales are discontent scale, distrust scale, pessimism scale, and individual anomie scale. These four subscales are designed to reflect our theoretical propositions about a potential public temperament during a system transition. The 32 items cover a wide-range of specific issues that billions of Chinese urban residents had to face during the Economic Reform. From these 32 nation-specific items we identified eight non-nation-specific domains with broader cultural implications.

2.1. *The Discontent Scale.* The discontent scale is a measurement of (1) individuals' assessment of their experiences in a changing stratification system and (2) their opinions about larger social and economic issues during the system transition. There are three items measuring respondents' individual discontent and six items measuring their system discontent in the subscale.

2.2. *The Distrust Scale.* The distrust scale is a measurement of people's evaluation of government's competence. Respondents with doubts over government's intention and competence in dealing with the emerging problems in the transition should have

higher levels of distrust in the government. Their level of distrust is measured through a set of 11 items covering areas in politics, economy, and social life.

2.4. *The Pessimism Scale.* The pessimism scale is a measurement of people's assessment of their past mobility and their judgment of the openness of the opportunity structure. The subscale consists six items of mobility in two core areas: past and future. The past and future mobility have been identified as the core elements with broader cultural implications.

2.5. *The Individual Anomie Scale*. The anomie scale is a measure of individual state of mind in which they as individuals or groups are not sure about their future, cannot turn to anyone for trust, and feel confused about the social norms and appropriate behavioral patterns. The anomic state of mind, as we argued in our theoretical assumptions, may be a product of structural strains that pressure individuals to take on conflicting roles or a reflection of the frustration by people living through the system transition. There are six items in the anomie subscale. No core element has been identified due to the general applicability of the items used in this scale.

2.6. *Instrument Applicability*. The close inter-subsale association found in this research points to the flexibility of the instrument application. The instrument can be used separately to gauge public opinions of certain aspect or aspects of social life or can be combined into a larger measure of (dis)satisfaction as a cohesive measurement continuum. Core elements identified through the instrument development can be administered to populations other than in the test area with nation-specific items.

3.0. **Elements of social instability**. We maintain that elements of social instability are unlikely to be distributed evenly across the society since individuals may have been influenced differently by the social occurrences and events. The empirical findings from the present survey support our assertion. However, not all our hypotheses and expectations are found valid in this research.

3.1. *Elements of Social Instability among China's Sociodemographic Groups.* On measurements of discontent, it was found in each case at the .05 significance level that female, the young, the less-educated, the unemployed, and Party-members generally displayed higher levels of discontent. On measures of distrust, it was found in each case at the .05 significance level that female, the young, and the educated tended to hold back their confidence in government. Interestingly, people working in the Party and government agencies revealed higher levels of distrust in the government's competence. On measures of pessimism, it was found in each case at the .05 significance level that female, the younger, the less educated respondents had a strong sense of pessimism. On measures of anomie, similar patterns were found across gender, age, and education groups as in the pessimist scale at the .05 significance level.

3.2. *Elements of Social Instability among Chinese Cities.* The twenty cities surveyed this project vary in size, location, and wealth. It was found in each case at the .05 significance level that respondents living in cities with less population, less wealth, and in less developed areas showed high level of discontent, high level of distrust in government, and strong sense of pessimism. However, on measurements of individual anomie, the trend somewhat reverses itself to reveal that respondents living in rich and developed cities tended to adapt anomic attitude than respondents of poor and western cities. The finding suggests that instead of engaging in an active

political participation, people with strong disapproving attitude in the system transition may take an apathetic or cynical attitude toward life.

3.3. *Elements of Social Instability among China's SES Groups.* In this research we placed each individual respondent on a three-dimensional ladder in line with their scores of absolute deprivation (AD), of status inconsistency (SI), and of subjective social comparison (RD). It was found in each case at the significance level of .05 that people with higher scores in AD, SI, and RD tended to have greater discontent, greater pessimistic feelings, and greater amonic feelings. However, on measurements of distrust in government, no significant difference was found across the SES groups except for people with high RD scores. People who considered themselves inferior to others around them tended to lose their confidence in government's intentions and competence.

4.0. **Elements of Social Instability and System Reaction**. To further explore elements of social instability, a sequential system of cause-and-effect has been set up. At stage one, people have different locations in the system as measured by AD, SI, and RD. Their social locations affect their opinions and attitudes about the transitional system as measured by subscales of discontent, distrust, pessimism, and individual anomie at stage two. This disapproving popular temperament constitutes elements of social instability to which system has no choice but reacts in some way at stage three. The chains in our block ordered system represent our repeated assertion throughout this report that elements of social instability as a social property result from the transformation of the system and thus should be alleviated by the system adjustment.

4.1. In our effort to further investigate the relationship among all the eight variables in our three-block ordered system, we have found that contrary to our expectation, respondents with higher scores on Absolute Deprivation tended to have lower levels of discontent and distrust. We therefore conclude that there are some merits in the statement that absolute deprivation among the population does not produce disapproving sentiments but feelings of relative deprivation and an inadequate and imbalance stratification system do.

5.0. **Further Exploration.** Some interesting findings have emerged from this research project. Among the most interesting ones we emphasize the following:

(1) Somewhat out of popular expectation, some social and economic groups that have been benefited most from the current reforming policies and practices are found sharing the public confusion and disapproving feelings.

(2) Respondents who are formally affiliated with the ruling party/government have taken on a more cynical attitude toward the government's policies and performance.

(3) Workers that constitute over half of the city population show greater discontent and distrust.

(4) Somewhat out of our own expectation, the general patterns of social instability found in this research fail to show clear trends among cities of different population and wealth.

There may be different implications from those interesting findings. However, we suggest further studies of similar types be focused on a refinement of the social warning instrument developed in this research; on further investigation on the patterns of social instability found in this study across social and economic groups,

and on the relationship between people's disapproving feelings and their behaviors during a system transition.

5 Bibliography

Afshar F. and Batzli S.: For Discussion: A Model of Anomie: Accelerated Social Change Creates Conflicts - Crisis - Thratening Breakdowns of Social Order. Swiss Academy for Development 1995.

Alreck L. and Settle B.: The Survey Research Handbook. London. 1996.

Atteslander, P. (ed.): Anomie - Social Destabilization and the Development of Early Warning Systems, a special volume of the International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, vol.15 (8-10) 1995.

Babbie, E.: The Practice of Social Research. New York 1995

Borre, O. and Scarbrough E. (ed.): The Scope of Government. Oxford University Press, 1995.

Cernea M.M.: Research Monitoring of Anomie Research. Mimeo 1995

Chinese Statistical Bureau: Statistical Survey of China. Beijing 1996.

Galtung J.: Research Monitoring of Anomie Research. Mimeo 1995.

Devellis M : Scale Development. London. 1991.

Everitt B. S.: An Introduction to Latent Variable Models. New York 1984.

Goldstone J.A. (ed.): Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies. New York 1994.

Gransow B. and Li H.L.: Chinas Neue Werte. München 1995.

Hilbert R.: Anomie and The Moral Regulation of Reality: The Durkheimian Tradition in Modern Relief. in: Sociological Theory. vol. 4: 1-19 1986

Inglehart R.: Kultureller Umbruch. Frankfurt am Main 1995.

Kachigan S.K.: Multivariate Statistical Analysis. New York 1991.

Kaase M. and Newton K.: Belief in Government. Oxford University Press 1995.

Keddie N. (ed.): Debating Revolution. New York 1995

Klingermann H.D. and Fuchs D. (ed.): Citizens and the State. Oxford University Press 1995.

Lanyon A., Li H.L., Wang Q., Western J.: Anomie. Mimeo 1995

Li H.L.: Die Grundstruktur der Chinesischen Gesellschaft. Opladen 1991.

Li H.L. and Wang Q.: Research on the Chinese Work Unit Society. New York 1996.

Loehlin J.C.: Latent Variable Models. London 1987.

Mccutcheon A.: Latent Class Analysis. London 1987.

Nunnally P.: Psychometric Theory. Princton 1978.

Opp K.D.: The Rationality of Political Protest. London 1989.

Robinson J. and Shaver P.: Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes. Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research 1973.

Srole L.: The Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: A Exploratory Study. in: American Sociological Review. 21: 709-716

Travis R.: The MOS Alienation Scale: AnAlternative To Srole's Anomia Scale. in: Social Indicators Research 28: 71-91 1993

Wang Q., Western J., Lanyon A., Li H.L.: Working Report of Anomie Research. Mimeo 1995.

Tanur J. (ed.): Questions about Questions. New York 1992.

Zapf W.: Modernisierung, Wohlfahrtsentwicklung und Transformation. Berlin 1994.